The common property resource problem and the creation of limited property rights

Human Ecology ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fikret Berkes
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Common Property Resource ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Creation

Vickers Hot Springs

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Jennifer M. Bernstein
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Hot Springs ◽  
Public Access ◽  
Common Property Resource ◽  
Resource Conflict ◽  
Social Ecological ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Local Residents ◽  
The Common

Vickers Hot Springs is located near the rural Southern California town of Ojai, and local residents have long enjoyed soaking in the sulfuric pools. But as knowledge of the springs spread, the area saw increases in fights, traffic, burglaries, and drug use. In response, two residents purchased the land and committed to restore the property while allowing limited public access, subsequently generating a great deal of controversy within the community. Privatizing Vickers Hot Springs follows the archetypical lesson of Garrett Hardin's 1968 essay, “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Hardin stated that the problem for common-pool resources was that a finite amount of services are demanded by a potentially infinite number of users, who have little to gain by sacrificing for the common good. But Hardin's theory does not always apply. Many communities have come together to manage resources, often without government oversight. Thus, the question is not whether or not Hardin's theory is accurate, but rather “under what conditions it is correct and when it makes the wrong predictions.” Case studies provide nuance to the broad brushstrokes of a theory, and whether Hardin's parable is applicable depends on the particularities of the common property resource conflict. Employing the frameworks established by Hardin, Dietz et al., and Ostrom, this paper examines the management of Vickers Hot Springs within its broader social, ecological, and political context, asking whether the particular circumstances of this resource use conflict made privatization the most predictable outcome.

scholarly journals The influence of common property rights on forest management policy: a case study in Sardinia region, Italy

2012 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Paletto ◽  
Isabella De Meo ◽  
Fabrizio Ferretti
Keyword(s):  
Forest Management ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Local Development ◽  
Management Policy ◽  
Private Forests ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Common

Abstract The property rights and the type of ownership (private owners, public domain and commons) are two fundamental concepts in relationship to the local development and to the social and environmental sustainability. Common forests were established in Europe since the Middle Ages, but over the centuries the importance of commons changed in parallel with economic and social changes. In recent decades, the scientific debate focused on the forest management efficiency and sustainability of this type of ownership in comparison to the public and private property. In Italy common forests have a long tradition with substantial differences in the result of historical evolution in various regions. In Sardinia region the private forests are 377.297 ha, the public forests are 201.324 ha, while around 120.000 ha are commons. The respect of the common rights changed in the different historical periods. Today, the common lands are managed directly by municipalities or indirectly through third parties, in both cases the involvement of members of community is very low. The main objective of the paper is to analyse forest management differences in public institutions with and without common property rights. To achieve the objective of the research the forest management preferences of community members and managers were evaluated and compared. The analysis was realized through the use of the principal-agent model and it has been tested in a case study in Sardinia region (Arci-Grighine district). The analysis of the results showed that the categories of actors considered (members of community, municipalities and managers) have a marked productive profile, but municipalities manage forests perceiving a moderate multifunctionality. Moreover, the representatives of the municipalities pay more attention to the interests of the collectivity in comparison to the external managers. They also attribute high importance to environmental and social forest functions.

scholarly journals Community forestry in Nepal: a model of common property resource management

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 36-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
K.P. Acharya
Keyword(s):  
Resource Management ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Community Forestry ◽  
Forest Land ◽  
Community Forest ◽  
Common Property Resource ◽  
User Groups ◽  
The Common ◽  
Common Property Resource Management ◽  
Forest User

The management of common forest land as community forest in Nepal is in practice since 1978. Studies showing the linkages between community forestry and common property resource are scanty in the country. This article discusses characteristics of common property resources and the principles and practices of community forestry in Nepal which is an example of common property resource management between Government agencies and users (co-managers). Forest User Groups (FUGs ) are the institutions responsible to manage the common property.

Towards a Predictive Model for the Economic Regulation of Commercial Fisheries

1980 ◽  
Vol 37 (7) ◽  
pp. 1111-1129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin W. Clark
Keyword(s):  
Open Access ◽  
Economic Performance ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Commercial Fisheries ◽  
Economic Regulation ◽  
Commercial Fishery ◽  
Total Catch ◽  
Common Property Resource ◽  
Limited Entry ◽  
The Common

A model of the commercial fishery, incorporating the microeconomic decisions of individual vessel operation, is developed and employed to predict the consequences of various methods of regulation, including: (i) total catch quotas; (ii) vessel licenses; (iii) taxes on catch (or effort); (iv) allocated catch (or effort) quotas. Among the principal predictions of the analysis are: (a) total catch quotas do not improve the economic performance of an open-access fishery; (b) limited entry results in distortion of inputs unless every input is controlled; (c) taxes and allocated transferable catch quotas are theoretically equivalent to one another in terms of economic efficiency, and both are capable in principle of optimizing exploitation of the common-property fishery.Key words: economics, fishery regulation, management, quotas, licenses, taxes, fishermen's quotas, common-property resource

scholarly journals The law of private nuisance following Wu: Emanation and access

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Matthew Mazenier
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Common Property ◽  
The Body ◽  
Limited Effect ◽  
The Core ◽  
Lack Of Control ◽  
The Common ◽  
Right Of Access ◽  
The Relationship

<p>The boundaries of nuisance have traditionally been tightly guarded. However, the tort’s underlying concern for the protection of property rights has provided it with sufficient flexibility to adapt to changing social and legal circumstances. The New Zealand Court of Appeal’s decision in Body Corporate 366611 v Wu represents the extension of private nuisance to remedy gaps in the tort’s application to the relationship between body corporates and individual proprietors under the Unit Titles Act 1972. The case concerned the defendant Body Corporate’s denial of access to an individual proprietor with an interest in the common property from which the nuisance ‘emanated’. Though the Court erred in its interpretation of existing nuisance principles relating to emanation, its decision can be rationalised on the basis that the plaintiff’s lack of control and restricted access speak to the core interests protected by the tort. Given the Court’s finding that access restrictions may be reasonably imposed upon occupiers under the Body Corporate’s modified rules, the decision’s limited effect is to provide an individual proprietor with a figurative right of access. Outside of clarifying these doctrinal uncertainties, the decision does not produce lasting ramifications for private nuisance.</p>

scholarly journals The law of private nuisance following Wu: Emanation and access

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Matthew Mazenier
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Common Property ◽  
The Body ◽  
Limited Effect ◽  
The Core ◽  
Lack Of Control ◽  
The Common ◽  
Right Of Access ◽  
The Relationship

<p>The boundaries of nuisance have traditionally been tightly guarded. However, the tort’s underlying concern for the protection of property rights has provided it with sufficient flexibility to adapt to changing social and legal circumstances. The New Zealand Court of Appeal’s decision in Body Corporate 366611 v Wu represents the extension of private nuisance to remedy gaps in the tort’s application to the relationship between body corporates and individual proprietors under the Unit Titles Act 1972. The case concerned the defendant Body Corporate’s denial of access to an individual proprietor with an interest in the common property from which the nuisance ‘emanated’. Though the Court erred in its interpretation of existing nuisance principles relating to emanation, its decision can be rationalised on the basis that the plaintiff’s lack of control and restricted access speak to the core interests protected by the tort. Given the Court’s finding that access restrictions may be reasonably imposed upon occupiers under the Body Corporate’s modified rules, the decision’s limited effect is to provide an individual proprietor with a figurative right of access. Outside of clarifying these doctrinal uncertainties, the decision does not produce lasting ramifications for private nuisance.</p>

scholarly journals Bioeconomic Modeling of the Gulf Shrimp Fishery: An Application to Galveston Bay and Adjacent Offshore Areas

1978 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vito Blomo ◽  
Kenneth Stokes ◽  
Wade Griffin ◽  
William Grant ◽  
John Nichols
Keyword(s):  
Economic Efficiency ◽  
Opportunity Cost ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Galveston Bay ◽  
Common Property Resource ◽  
Shrimp Fishery ◽  
The Core ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Economic Improvement

The concept of laissez-faire is widely recognized in capitalistic economies. At the core of this operating philosophy is the belief that individualistic competition will result in an economic improvement, not only for the individual but also for society. However, when this approach is tied to the exploitation of a common property resource, the outcome is just the opposite—in terms of economic efficiency the common property resource is overexploited because the factor cost to the firm does not equal the opportunity cost to society. That is, although a common property resource is a scarce good to society, it is a free good to individuals. The usual result is a level of exploitation which may endanger the future biological viability of the resource. With shrimp, however, this concern is not critical because shrimp is an annual crop; fishing will cease as a result of economic, and not biological, considerations.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document