Lexicographic egalitarian solution and uncertainty in the disagreement point

1989 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 259-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Y. Chun
Keyword(s):  
Disagreement Point ◽  
Egalitarian Solution

A Perspective-Invariant Approach to Nash Bargaining

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Nalebuff
Keyword(s):  
Business Strategy ◽  
Ideal Point ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Disagreement Point ◽  
Equal Sacrifice ◽  
Symmetry Axiom ◽  
Bargaining Sets ◽  
Invariant Approach ◽  
Do So

The Nash axioms lead to different results depending on whether the negotiation is framed in terms of gains relative to no agreement or in terms of sacrifices relative to an ideal. We look for a solution that leads to the same result from both perspectives. To do so, we restrict the application of Nash’s IIA axiom to bargaining sets where all options are individually rational and none exceed either party’s ideal point. If we normalize the bargaining set so that the disagreement point is (0, 0) and maximal gains are (1, 1), then any perspective-invariant bargaining solution must lie between the Utilitarian solution and the maximal equal-gain (minimal equal-sacrifice) solution. We show that a modified version of Nash’s symmetry axiom leads to the Utilitarian solution and that a reciprocity axiom leads to the equal-gain (equal-sacrifice) solution, both of which are perspective invariant. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, Business Strategy.

THE EXTENSION OF DUTTA–RAY'S SOLUTION TO CONVEX NTU GAMES

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (04) ◽  
pp. 339-361
Author(s):  
ELENA YANOVSKAYA
Keyword(s):  
Axiomatic Characterization ◽  
Convexity Property ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
Ntu Games ◽  
The Core ◽  
Egalitarian Solution

The egalitarian solution for the class of convex TU games was defined by Dutta and Ray [1989] and axiomatized by Dutta 1990. An extension of this solution — the egalitarian split-off set (ESOS) — to the class of non-levelled NTU games is proposed. On the class of TU games it coincides with the egalitarian split-off set [Branzei et al. 2006]. The proposed extension is axiomatized as the maximal (w.r.t. inclusion) solution satisfying consistency à la Hart–Mas-Colell and agreeing with the solution of constrained egalitarianism for arbitrary two-person games. For ordinal convex NTU games the ESOS turns out to be single-valued and contained in the core. The totally cardinal convexity property of NTU games is defined. For the class of ordinal and total cardinal convex NTU games an axiomatic characterization of the Dutta–Ray solution with the help of Peleg consistency is given.

scholarly journals The egalitarian solution for convex games: some characterizations

2000 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Flip Klijn ◽  
Marco Slikker ◽  
Stef Tijs ◽  
José Zarzuelo
Keyword(s):  
Convex Games ◽  
Egalitarian Solution

scholarly journals The procedural egalitarian solution

2017 ◽  
Vol 106 ◽  
pp. 179-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bas Dietzenbacher ◽  
Peter Borm ◽  
Ruud Hendrickx
Keyword(s):  
Egalitarian Solution
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