Moral voices, moral selves: About getting it right in moral theory

Human Studies ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 16 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 143-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Hekman
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Voices

Critique of Callicott's Biosocial Moral Theory

2007 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Hadley
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory

Relational Ethics and Partiality

Theoria ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 64 (152) ◽  
pp. 53-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Motsamai Molefe
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Relational Ethics ◽  
The Individual

AbstractIn this article, I question the plausibility of Metz’s African moral theory from an oft neglected moral topic of partiality. Metz defends an Afro-communitarian moral theory that posits that the rightness of actions is entirely definable by relationships of identity and solidarity (or, friendship). I offer two objections to this relational moral theory. First, I argue that justifying partiality strictly by invoking relationships (of friendship) ultimately fails to properly value the individual for her own sake – this is called the ‘focus problem’ in the literature. Second, I argue that a relationship-based theory cannot accommodate the agent-related partiality since it posits some relationship to be morally fundamental. My critique ultimately reveals the inadequacy of a relationship-based moral theory insofar as it overlooks some crucial moral considerations grounded on the individual herself in her own right.

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