Vico and some Kantian reflections on historical judgment

Man and World ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rudolf A. Makkreel
Keyword(s):  
1981 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-28
Author(s):  
Hayward R. Alker

AbstractI write my comments on Von Laue's encomium to Stalin's "Tragic greatness" not as a specialist in Soviet affairs but as someone primarily concerned with humanizing the practice and possibilities of contemporary world politics. In reacting to his essay, first let me applaud Von Laue's effort to convey a "compassionate understanding" of Stalin's evil "greatness." Secondly, I shall comment critically on his standards for judging, or refraining from judging, Stalin's political greatness and moral responsibility. Thirdly, I shall address certain issues which these views raise when reapplied to the contemporary Soviet-American foreign policy context from which they originate.


2014 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Valero Fesko

Much attention has been drawn to Jacob Arminius’s (1560–1609) views on predestination, especially given the eventual rejection of those views by the Synod of Dort (1618–1619). However what some may not realize is that Arminius’s doctrine of justification, especially as it relates to the role and function of faith, was also a source of contention. Historically Reformed theologians viewed faith as purely instrumental in justification, whereas Arminius construed it as foundational. The difference between the two positions can be illustrated in the difference between two prepositions: justification per (through or by) faith vs. justification propter (on account of) faith. Arminius’s views were subsequently rejected by three Reformed confessions, the Canons of Dort, the Irish Articles (1615), and the Westminster Confession (1647). This essay therefore argues, pace much of the recent literature on the subject, that Arminius’s doctrine of justification is Protestant, in that it is not Roman Catholic, but it is not Reformed according to the definitions set forth by its historic confessions—this is a historical judgment, not a dogmatic one.


Author(s):  
Carmen Camey Marroquín

Este artículo discute sobre la posibilidad de realizar juicios morales e históricos y sobre cómo éstos trascienden al mero juicio legal, ilustrado a través de la obra de Hannah Aren- dt: Eichmann en Jerusalén: un estudio sobre la banalidad del mal. Asimismo, se profundiza en la teoría arendtiana de la banalidad del mal y la relación que ésta tiene con los diferentes tipos de juicio implícitos en el proceso de Jerusalén, así como la incapacidad de ejercer un juicio, y las consecuencias que eso conlleva al imposibilitar la re exión y las respuestas personales ante los con ictos morales. Se relaciona el juicio histórico con la pregunta sobre el impacto de las acciones individuales en la historia. This paper discusses the possibility of making moral and historical judgements, and if these transcend the sheer legal judgment by using the works of Hannah Arendt: Eichmann in Jeru- salem: A Study of Evil’s Banality. In addition, I consider Arendt’s theory of the banality of Evil and the relationship of this with other kinds of judgments implicit in the alleged process of Jerusalem. I also consider the incapacity of casting judgment, and the consequences that this bears when incapacitates for re ection and personal responses to moral con ict. I also relate the historical judgment with the question about the impact of individual actions in history. 


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