A cognitive unconscious?

1988 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 291-293
Author(s):  
Mario Rendon
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Unconscious

The Cognitive Unconscious

Science ◽  
1987 ◽  
pp. 1638-1638
Author(s):  
J. S. KAFKA
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Unconscious

The self-organizing conundrum

2002 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 334-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnaud Destrebecqz ◽  
Axel Cleeremans
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Cognitive Unconscious ◽  
Self Organizing

Perruchet and Vinter stop short of fully embracing the implications of their own SOC framework, and hence end up defending an implausible perspective on consciousness. We suggest instead that consciousness should be viewed as a graded dimension defined over quality of representation. This graded perspective eliminates the most problematic aspects of the cognitive unconscious without denying its existence altogether.

scholarly journals Why decision making may not require awareness

2014 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-36
Author(s):  
I. P. L. McLaren ◽  
B. D. Dunn ◽  
N. S. Lawrence ◽  
F. N. Milton ◽  
F. Verbruggen ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Significant Role ◽  
Cognitive Unconscious

AbstractNewell & Shanks (N&S) argue against the idea that any significant role for unconscious influences on decision making has been established by research to date. Inasmuch as this conclusion applies to the idea of an “intelligent cognitive unconscious,” we would agree. Our concern is that the article could lead the unwary to conclude that there are no unconscious influences on decision making – and never could be. We give reasons why this may not be the case.

scholarly journals Unconscious influences on decision making: A critical review

2014 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben R. Newell ◽  
David R. Shanks
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Behavior ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Critical Review ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Cognitive Unconscious

AbstractTo what extent do we know our own minds when making decisions? Variants of this question have preoccupied researchers in a wide range of domains, from mainstream experimental psychology (cognition, perception, social behavior) to cognitive neuroscience and behavioral economics. A pervasive view places a heavy explanatory burden on an intelligent cognitive unconscious, with many theories assigning causally effective roles to unconscious influences. This article presents a novel framework for evaluating these claims and reviews evidence from three major bodies of research in which unconscious factors have been studied: multiple-cue judgment, deliberation without attention, and decisions under uncertainty. Studies of priming (subliminal and primes-to-behavior) and the role of awareness in movement and perception (e.g., timing of willed actions, blindsight) are also given brief consideration. The review highlights that inadequate procedures for assessing awareness, failures to consider artifactual explanations of “landmark” results, and a tendency to uncritically accept conclusions that fit with our intuitions have all contributed to unconscious influences being ascribed inflated and erroneous explanatory power in theories of decision making. The review concludes by recommending that future research should focus on tasks in which participants' attention is diverted away from the experimenter's hypothesis, rather than the highly reflective tasks that are currently often employed.

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