Commitments to threat strategies in Nash bargaining

1993 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wen Mao
Keyword(s):  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Threat Strategies

scholarly journals Joint Innovation Investment and Pricing Decisions in Retail Supply Chains with Customer Value

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1309
Author(s):  
Jiali Qu ◽  
Benyong Hu ◽  
Chao Meng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Customer Value ◽  
Business Models ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Game Equilibrium

In the retail industry, customer value has become the key to maintaining competitive advantages. In the era of new retail, customer value is not only affected by the product price, but it is also closely related to innovations, such as value-added services and unique business models. In this paper, we study the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in a retailer–supplier supply chain based on revenue sharing contracts and customer value. We first find that, in the non-cooperative game, equilibrium only exists in the supplier Stackelberg game. However, revenue sharing contracts cannot coordinate the supply chain in the non-cooperative game. By considering supply chain members’ bargaining power, we find that there exists a unique equilibrium for the Nash bargaining product. In addition, revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the optimal consumer surplus. When the supply chain is coordinated, supply chain profit is allocated to the supply chain members based on their bargaining powers.

scholarly journals Can Social Agents Efficiently Perform in Automated Negotiation?

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (13) ◽  
pp. 6022
Author(s):  
Victor Sanchez-Anguix ◽  
Okan Tunalı ◽  
Reyhan Aydoğan ◽  
Vicente Julian
Keyword(s):  
Utility Function ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Automated Negotiation ◽  
Social Agents ◽  
Social Agent ◽  
Opponent Modeling ◽  
Social Metrics ◽  
Tit For Tat ◽  
Final Agreement

In the last few years, we witnessed a growing body of literature about automated negotiation. Mainly, negotiating agents are either purely self-driven by maximizing their utility function or by assuming a cooperative stance by all parties involved in the negotiation. We argue that, while optimizing one’s utility function is essential, agents in a society should not ignore the opponent’s utility in the final agreement to improve the agent’s long-term perspectives in the system. This article aims to show whether it is possible to design a social agent (i.e., one that aims to optimize both sides’ utility functions) while performing efficiently in an agent society. Accordingly, we propose a social agent supported by a portfolio of strategies, a novel tit-for-tat concession mechanism, and a frequency-based opponent modeling mechanism capable of adapting its behavior according to the opponent’s behavior and the state of the negotiation. The results show that the proposed social agent not only maximizes social metrics such as the distance to the Nash bargaining point or the Kalai point but also is shown to be a pure and mixed equilibrium strategy in some realistic agent societies.

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