Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs

1996 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 555-564 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dimitrios Diamantaras ◽  
Robert P. Gilles ◽  
Suzanne Scotchmer
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Optima ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
Public Projects ◽  
Convex Costs

Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs

1996 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 555-564 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dimitrios Diamantaras ◽  
Robert P. Gilles ◽  
Suzanne Scotchmer
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Optima ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
Public Projects ◽  
Convex Costs

Initiative budgeting: experience of Russian regions

2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 114-122
Author(s):  
N. A. Lysova
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Russian Regions ◽  
Participatory Budgeting ◽  
Public Projects ◽  
Russian Model

Experience of participatory budgeting in municipalities of Russian regions is reviewed in the paper. Forms of participation of the population in decision-making, as well as in the selection, realization and co-financing of public projects have been investigated. The analysis of the practices made it possible to identify the features and prospects of the Russian model of initiative budgeting.

The Political Economy of Italy's Decline

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Lorenzo Capussela
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Accountability ◽  
Private Goods

This book offers an interpretation of Italy’s decline, which began two decades before the Great Recession. It argues that its deeper roots lie in the political economy of growth. This interpretation is illustrated through a discussion of Italy’s political and economic history since its unification, in 1861. The emphasis is placed on the country’s convergence to the productivity frontier and TFP performance, and on the evolution of its social order and institutions. The lens through which its history is reviewed, to illuminate the origins and evolution of the current constraints to growth, is drawn from institutional economics and Schumpeterian growth theory. It is exemplified by analysing two alternative reactions to the insufficient provision of public goods: an opportunistic one—employing tax evasion, corruption, or clientelism as means to appropriate private goods—and one based on enforcing political accountability. From the perspective of ordinary citizens and firms such social dilemmas can typically be modelled as coordination games, which have multiple equilibria. Self-interested rationality can thus lead to a spiral, in which several mutually reinforcing vicious circles lead society onto an inefficient equilibrium characterized by low political accountability and weak rule of law. The book follows the gradual setting in of this spiral, despite an ambitious attempt at institutional reform, in 1962–4, and its resumption after a severe endogenous shock, in 1992–4. It concludes that innovative ideas can overcome the constraints posed by that spiral, and ease the country’s shift onto a fairer and more efficient equilibrium.

scholarly journals Swords and Plowshares: Property Rights, Collective Action, and Nonstate Governance in the Jewish Community of Palestine 1920–1948

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
DAVID MUCHLINSKI
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Jewish Community ◽  
Causal Effect ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
Agricultural Communities ◽  
Institutional Variation ◽  
Subnational Governance

Developing states lacking a monopoly over the use of force are commonly seen as having failed to live up to the ideal Weberian sovereign type. Yet rather than being a calling card of anarchy, the devolution of important state functions to subnational actors is a rational strategy for developing states to effectively provide important public goods. The case study of the Jewish Community of Palestine demonstrates one instance where subnational communities provided public goods. This study highlights the causal effect of property rights within institutions to drive behavior consistent with the provision of public and private goods. Analyzing temporal and institutional variation across two agricultural communities demonstrates a unique strategy of subnational governance and public goods provision in a developing state. Devolution of public goods provision to subnational actors may be an alternative strategy of governance for developing states that are not yet able to effectively provide important public goods.

Evading the Patronage Trap: Organizational Capacity and Demand Making in Mexico

2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (13-14) ◽  
pp. 2097-2134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Palmer-Rubin
Keyword(s):  
Social Class ◽  
Small Business ◽  
Organizational Capacity ◽  
Process Tracing ◽  
Economic Interest ◽  
Business Organizations ◽  
Economic Sectors ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
Original Survey ◽  
Interest Organizations

When do organizations broadly represent the interests of their economic sectors and when do they narrowly represent the interests of members? This article investigates how agricultural and small-business organizations in Mexico make demands for programmatic policies or patronage benefits. Contrary to explanations based on the class of members, I show that the source of organizational capacity shapes demand-making strategies. Organizations that generate selective benefits internally are able to engage in programmatic policies that shape sectoral competitiveness, whereas organizations that fail to solve membership challenges internally are vulnerable to the patronage trap, a self-reproducing cycle wherein they become specialized in demand making for discretionary private goods. I generate this argument through process tracing of two agricultural organizations in Mexico. Analysis of an original survey of economic interest organizations provides broader evidence that organizational capacity is a better predictor of policy demands than social class.

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