?Distribution-free? estimates of efficiency in the U.S. banking industry and tests of the standard distributional assumptions

1993 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen N. Berger
Keyword(s):  
Banking Industry ◽  
Distribution Free ◽  
Distributional Assumptions ◽  
The U.S

Once bitten twice shy? Evidence from the U.S. banking industry during the crash of the energy market

2020 ◽  
Vol 92 ◽  
pp. 104981
Author(s):  
Zhongdong Chen ◽  
Karen Ann Craig ◽  
Mikhael Karpovics
Keyword(s):  
Banking Industry ◽  
Energy Market ◽  
The U.S

The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a Long, Strange Trip It's Been

1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (2) ◽  
pp. 55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen N. Berger ◽  
Anil K Kashyap ◽  
Joseph M. Scalise ◽  
Mark Gertler ◽  
Benjamin M. Friedman
Keyword(s):  
Banking Industry ◽  
The U.S

The diffusion of production processes in the U.S. banking industry: A finite mixture approach

1997 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 721-740 ◽  
Author(s):  
T.Randolph Beard ◽  
Steven B. Caudill ◽  
Daniel M. Gropper
Keyword(s):  
Banking Industry ◽  
Finite Mixture ◽  
Production Processes ◽  
The U.S

scholarly journals FDICIA and Risk Shifting 1n the Banking Industry

2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-116
Author(s):  
Seok-Weon Lee
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Systematic Risk ◽  
Full Sample ◽  
Risk Taking Behavior ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance ◽  
Asset Size ◽  
The U.S

This is an empirical study that examines how the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 in the U.S. banking industry affects the moral hazard risk-taking incentives of banks. We find that FDICIA appears to be effective in significantly reducing the systematic risk-taking incentives of the banks. Considering that the banks' asset portfolios are necessarily largely systematic risk-related, the significant decrease in their systematic risk-taking incentives provides some evidence of the effectiveness of FDICIA. However, with respect to the nonsystematic risk-taking behavior, the results generally indicate statistically insignificant decreases in the risk-taking incentives after FDICIA. To well-diversified investors who can diversify nonsystematic risk away, nonsystematic risk may not be a risk any more. However, to maintain a sound banking environment and to reduce the risk to individual banks, this result implies that regulatory agents should monitor the banks’ nonsystematic risk-taking behavior more closely, as long as it is positively related to the banks’ failures. We further test the change in the risk-taking incentives by partitioning the full sample into two groups: Banks with higher moral hazard incentives as those with larger asset size and lower capital ratio and banks with lower moral hazard incentives as those with smaller asset size and higher capital ratio. The main result for this test is that, with FDICIA, the decrease in the risk-taking incentives of the banks with higher moral hazard incentives (larger asset-size and lower capital-ratio banks) is less than that of the banks with lower moral hazard incentives (smaller asset-size and higher capital-ratio banks), with respect to both systematic and nonsystematic risk-taking measures. Furthermore, the change in the nonsystematic risk-taking incentives of the banks with higher moral hazard incentives is rather mixed, while their systematic incentives are decreased. These findings imply that the regulatory agents should allocate more time and effort toward monitoring the banks with higher moral hazard incentives with particular emphasis on their nonsystematic risk-taking behavior.

scholarly journals The Effect Of Consolidation On Employees In The U.S. Banking Industry

2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph N. Heiney
Keyword(s):  
Banking Industry ◽  
Font Size ◽  
Banking Institutions ◽  
The U.S

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: x-small;">This paper examines the effect of the continuing consolidation on employees in the U.S. banking industry between 1992 and 2004. It documents the decreasing number of banking institutions, the number of employees, and level of salaries and benefits.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The data indicates that while the number of banks has continued to decrease, the levels of employment and compensation have, in fact, increased during this period.</span></p>

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