A test of the predictive dimensions model in spatial voting theory

The theory of spatial voting has played a large role in the development of important results across many areas of political science. Directly testing the foundational assumptions of spatial voting theory, however, has not been possible with existing data. Using a novel survey design, this article obtains estimates of voter ideology on the same scale as candidate positions. The results of this scaling demonstrate that voters possess meaningful ideologies and, furthermore, that these beliefs are strongly related to the sorts of policy proposals considered in Congress. These ideology estimates are then used to uncover the actual relationships between ideology and vote choice for citizens of various types in the 2004 presidential election. Although the choices of independent voters are shown to be largely consistent with the assumptions of spatial voting theory, the decision rules used by partisans differ strongly from what unbiased spatial voting would imply. Although partisans do converge toward the behavior of independents, and hence toward the assumptions of spatial voting theory, as information levels increase, we see that even highly informed partisans show significant differences from what would be implied by unbiased spatial voting theory.

Download Full-text

In Search of the Uncovered Set

Political Analysis ◽

10.1093/pan/mpl007 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 15 (1) ◽

pp. 21-45 ◽

Cited By ~ 22

Author(s):

Nicholas R. Miller

Keyword(s):

Computational Algorithm ◽

Voting Theory ◽

Legislative Action ◽

Uncovered Set ◽

Political Analysis ◽

Spatial Voting ◽

Voting Games ◽

General Relevance ◽

Straight Line ◽

Theoretical Considerations

This paper pursues a number of theoretical explorations and conjectures pertaining to the uncovered set in spatial voting games. It was stimulated by the article “The Uncovered Set and the Limits of Legislative Action” by W. T. Bianco, I. Jeliazkov, and I. Sened (2004, Political Analysis 12:256—78) that employed a grid-search computational algorithm for estimating the size, shape, and location of the uncovered set, and it has been greatly facilitated by access to the CyberSenate spatial voting software being developed by Joseph Godfrey. I bring to light theoretical considerations that account for important features of the Bianco, Jeliazkov, and Sened results (e.g., the straight-line boundaries of uncovered sets displayed in some of their figures, the “unexpectedly large” uncovered sets displayed in other figures, and the apparent sensitivity of the location of uncovered sets to small shifts in the relative sizes of party caucuses) and present theoretical insights of more general relevance to spatial voting theory.

Download Full-text

On the Distortion Value of Elections with Abstention

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research ◽

10.1613/jair.1.12306 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 70 ◽

pp. 567-595

Author(s):

Masoud Seddighin ◽

Mohammad Latifian ◽

Mohammad Ghodsi

Keyword(s):

Complete Picture ◽

Voting Theory ◽

Value Change ◽

Spatial Voting ◽

Voting Mechanism ◽

Better Than

In Spatial Voting Theory, distortion is a measure of how good the winner is. It has been proved that no deterministic voting mechanism can guarantee a distortion better than 3, even for simple metrics such as a line. In this study, we wish to answer the following question: how does the distortion value change if we allow less motivated agents to abstain from the election? We consider an election with two candidates and suggest an abstention model, which is a general form of the abstention model proposed by Kirchgässner. Our results characterize the distortion ¨ value and provide a rather complete picture of the model.

Download Full-text

On the Distortion Value of the Elections with Abstention

Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence ◽

10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011981 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 33 ◽

pp. 1981-1988 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Mohammad Ghodsi ◽

Mohamad Latifian ◽

Masoud Seddighin

Keyword(s):

Complete Picture ◽

Voting Theory ◽

Value Change ◽

Spatial Voting ◽

Voting Mechanism ◽

Better Than

In Spatial Voting Theory, distortion is a measure of how good the winner is. It is proved that no deterministic voting mechanism can guarantee a distortion better than 3, even for simple metrics such as a line. In this study, we wish to answer the following question: how does the distortion value change if we allow less motivated agents to abstain from the election?We consider an election with two candidates and suggest an abstention model, which is a more general form of the abstention model proposed by Kirchgässner (2003). We define the¨ concepts of the expected winner and the expected distortion to evaluate the distortion of an election in our model. Our results fully characterize the distortion value and provide a rather complete picture of the model.

Download Full-text

Linking Theory and Empirics: Testing Spatial Voting Theory

Ideology and Spatial Voting in American Elections ◽

10.1017/cbo9781139198714.005 ◽

2012 ◽

pp. 66-102

Author(s):

Stephen A. Jessee

Keyword(s):

Voting Theory ◽

Spatial Voting

Download Full-text

Interest Group Ratings and Regression Inconsistency

Political Analysis ◽

10.1093/polana/9.3.260 ◽

2001 ◽

Vol 9 (3) ◽

pp. 260-274 ◽

Cited By ~ 11

Author(s):

Michael C. Herron

Keyword(s):

Least Squares ◽

Interest Group ◽

Party Affiliation ◽

Coefficient Estimate ◽

Voting Theory ◽

Spatial Voting ◽

Slope Estimate ◽

Bivariate Regression ◽

Linear Regressions ◽

Group Rating

This article uses spatial voting theory to analyze the properties of linear regressions that employ interest group ratings as measures of legislator policy preferences. Such regressions, in general, yield inconsistent results. In particular, least-squares estimation of a bivariate regression which contains an interest group rating as a regressor produces an inflated slope estimate. Instrumenting for the rating with a second rating, as proposed by Brunell et al. (1999), does not fix this problem, and this is because errors in both sets of ratings are correlated. Finally, estimation of a trivariate regression that contains an interest group rating and a party indicator on its right-hand side yields inconsistent slope estimates and, in particular, a party coefficient estimate of unreliable sign. Hence, regressions including both ratings and party indicators are not useful tools in the debate on whether party affiliation has an independent impact on legislator behavior.

Download Full-text