scholarly journals Multistrategy learning and theory revision

1993 ◽  
Vol 11 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 153-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenza Saitta ◽  
Marco Botta ◽  
Filippo Neri
Keyword(s):  
Theory Revision ◽  
Multistrategy Learning

Multistrategy Learning and Theory Revision

1993 ◽  
pp. 45-64
Author(s):  
Lorenza Saitta ◽  
Marco Botta ◽  
Filippo Neri
Keyword(s):  
Theory Revision ◽  
Multistrategy Learning

Extending the role of bias in probabilistic theory revision

1994 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronen Feldman ◽  
Moshe Koppel ◽  
Alberto Segre
Keyword(s):  
Theory Revision ◽  
Probabilistic Theory

On the degeneracy of the full AGM-theory of theory-revision

2006 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 661-676 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Tennant
Keyword(s):  
Theory Revision ◽  
Agm Theory ◽  
General Method ◽  
Theory Of Theory

AbstractA general method is provided whereby bizarre revisions of consistent theories with respect to contingent sentences that they refute can be delivered by revision-functions satisfying both the basic and the supplementary postulates of the AGM-theory of theory-revision.

scholarly journals Logical theory revision through data underdetermination: an anti-exceptionalist exercise

2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanderson Molick
Keyword(s):  
Theory Revision ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Logical Theory ◽  
Methodological Choices ◽  
Different Levels ◽  
Logical Data

The anti-exceptionalist debate brought into play the problem of what are the relevant data for logical theories and how such data affects the validities accepted by a logical theory. In the present paper, I depart from Laudan's reticulated model of science to analyze one aspect of this problem, namely of the role of logical data within the process of revision of logical theories. For this, I argue that the ubiquitous nature of logical data is responsible for the proliferation of several distinct methodologies for logical theories. The resulting picture is coherent with the Laudanean view that agreement and disagreement between scientific theories take place at different levels. From this perspective, one is able to articulate other kinds of divergence that considers not only the inferential aspects of a given logical theory, but also the epistemic aims and the methodological choices that drive its development.

scholarly journals On the metaphysics of (epistemological) logical anti-exceptionalism

2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Evelyn Fernandes Erickson
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Theory Revision ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Present Essay

A recent logical anti-exceptionalist trend proposes that logical theories are revisable in the same manner as scientific theories, either on grounds of the method of theory selection or on what counts as evidence for this revision. Given this approximation of logic and science, the present essay analyzes the commitments of both these varieties and argues that, as it currently stands, this kind of anti-exceptionalism is committed to scientific realism, that is, to realism about some unobservable entities evoked in logical theories. The essay argues that anti-exceptionalism cannot be separated into metaphysical and epistemological varieties, and proposed rather to label anti-exceptionalists views either broadly in terms of theory revision, or narrowly in terms of logic’s affinity with science.

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