Ontological relativity and the inscrutability of reference

1971 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 50-56
Author(s):  
Jacqueline Miller Thomason
Author(s):  
Jaroslav Peregrin

In his later writings Quine is increasingly explicit about the fact that his view of language is, in a certain sense, structuralistic. Structuralist interpretations of non-empirical, especially mathematical theories are now commonplace, but this chapter argues that Quine’s thought experiment with radical translation can be interpreted as showing that even empirical theories cannot be anchored in reality so firmly as to evade the same structuralist nature. Therefore, this peculiar form of structuralism extends to all our theories––the terms of all of them are best seen as meaning not definite substances, but nodes in certain structures. Moreover, radical translation shows––or purports to show––that the structure behind any natural language allows for some non-trivial ‘automorphisms’––that mapping the meaning of rabbit on that of undetached rabbit part, provided we make an appropriate remapping of many other meanings, does not change the language. Inscrutability of reference is then only a direct consequence.


Dialogue ◽  
1977 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-273
Author(s):  
Jean Largeault

Pour notre excuse, Quine est un auteur difficile. Si la version française de Word and Object (en abrégé WO), annoncée chez Payot, est correcte, elle rendra service, car il est malaisé de lire Quine dans le texte.


Author(s):  
Steve Myers

Abstract Jung saw a role for the methods of natural science in analytical psychology alongside other ways of developing of knowledge. This paper puts a cryptic and undeveloped idea in Psychological Types to the test using the principles of Karl Popper’s philosophy of science. The idea is a combination of Jung’s philosophy, esse in anima, and his theory of opposites applied to politics. It is explained using a term coined by the philosopher W.V.O Quine—ontological relativity. There are key similarities between the two philosophical concepts, due to Jung and Quine having a common influence in William James’ radical empiricism. The ontological relativity of political opposites is subjected to three tests that attempt to falsify it. All three attempts at falsification fail, which therefore provides some support for the idea. However, there are a number of anomalous results that raise significant questions requiring further research. This paper should therefore be viewed as the first step in a programme of research to examine the ontological relativity of political opposites that is inherent within esse in anima.


1997 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 265-272
Author(s):  
William Flesch

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document