Belief ascription

1986 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. W. Fitch
Keyword(s):  
Belief Ascription

scholarly journals When words speak louder than actions: delusion, belief and the power of assertion

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Rose ◽  
Wesley Buckwalter ◽  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Functional Profile ◽  
Belief Ascription ◽  
Professional Literature ◽  
Present Evidence ◽  
Track Record ◽  
Verbal Behaviour ◽  
Popular View ◽  
The Way

People suffering from severe monothematic delusions, such as Capgras, Fregoli, or Cotard patients, regularly assert extraordinary and unlikely things. For example, some say that their loved ones have been replaced by impostors. A popular view in philosophy and cognitive science is that such monothematic delusions aren't beliefs because they don't guide behaviour and affect in the way that beliefs do. Or, if they are beliefs, they are somehow anomalous, atypical, or marginal beliefs. We present evidence from five studies that folk psychology unambiguously views monothematic delusions as stereotypical beliefs. This calls into question widespread assumptions in the professional literature about belief's stereotypical functional profile. We also show that folk psychology views delusional patients as holding contradictory beliefs. And we show that frequent assertion is a powerful cue to belief ascription, more powerful than even a robust and consistent track record of non-verbal behaviour.

scholarly journals Saul Kripke on belief ascription

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-24
Author(s):  
Mircea Dumitru
Keyword(s):  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Belief Ascription

A test for theories of belief ascription

Analysis ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Frances
Keyword(s):  
Belief Ascription

Belief Ascription and Context Dependence

2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (12) ◽  
pp. 902-911 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Hunter
Keyword(s):  
Context Dependence ◽  
Belief Ascription
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