1. Condorcet winner proportions

1986 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 311-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. S. Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Condorcet Winner

The Game of Voting

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Balinski ◽  
Rida Laraki
Keyword(s):  
Condorcet Winner ◽  
Election Outcome ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Grade Distribution ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Strong Equilibria ◽  
Majority Judgment ◽  
Best Response Correspondence

This chapter compares majority judgment mechanism to other methods, including first-past-the-post and Borda’s method, among others, in the context of the game of voting. The concept of utilities, which depends on grade distribution of the electorate, is extended to election output. When the identity of the election winner is dependent on the utilities of voters, Condorcet-winner is elected by a large number of strong-equilibria strategy-profiles. The chapter explores best-response correspondence, according to which, if the number of possible equilibria is very small and sometimes unique, the Condorcet-winner emerges as the unique, possible equilibrium outcome and honest votes determine the election outcome.

Weak Condorcet winner(s) revisited

Public Choice ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 160 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 313-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan S. Felsenthal ◽  
Nicolaus Tideman
Keyword(s):  
Condorcet Winner

Content-Based Agendas and Qualified Majorities in Sequential Voting

2017 ◽  
Vol 107 (6) ◽  
pp. 1477-1506 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Kleiner ◽  
Benny Moldovanu
Keyword(s):  
Condorcet Winner ◽  
Simple Majority ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Practical Design ◽  
Finite Set ◽  
Sequential Voting ◽  
Sincere Voting ◽  
Strategic Skills

We analyze sequential, binary voting schemes in settings where several privately informed agents have single-peaked preferences over a finite set of alternatives, and we focus on robust equilibria that do not depend on assumptions about the players' beliefs about each other. Our main results identify two intuitive conditions on binary voting trees, ensuring that sincere voting at each stage forms an ex post perfect equilibrium. In particular, we uncover a strong rationale for content-based agendas: if the outcome should not be sensitive to beliefs about others, nor to the deployment of strategic skills, the agenda needs to be built “from the extremes to the middle” so that more extreme alternatives are both more difficult to adopt, and are put to vote before other, more moderate options. An important corollary is that, under simple majority, the equilibrium outcome of the incomplete information game is always the Condorcet winner. Finally, we aim to guide the practical design of schemes that are widely used by legislatures and committees and we illustrate our findings with several case studies. (JEL D71, D72, I10, J16, J32, K10)

Results on the Condorcet Winner

1986 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rick K. Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Condorcet Winner

scholarly journals The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 315-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Gehrlein ◽  
Michel Le Breton ◽  
Dominique Lepelley
Keyword(s):  
Condorcet Winner

scholarly journals Condorcet Loser in 2016: Apparently Trump; Condorcet Winner: Not Clinton?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1532673X2110094
Author(s):  
Richard F. Potthoff ◽  
Michael C. Munger
Keyword(s):  
Condorcet Winner ◽  
Voting Systems ◽  
Approval Voting ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Presidential Candidates ◽  
Clear Cut ◽  
Normative Standard ◽  
Voting Mechanisms ◽  
Essential Problem ◽  
Selection Of

Using thermometer score data from the ANES, we show that while there may have been no clear-cut Condorcet winner among the 2016 US presidential candidates, there appears to have been a Condorcet loser: Donald Trump. Thus the surprise is that the electorate preferred not only Hillary Clinton, but also the two “minor” candidates, Gary Johnson and Jill Stein, to Trump. Another surprise is that Johnson may have been the Condorcet winner. A minimal normative standard for evaluating voting systems is advanced, privileging those systems that select Condorcet winners if one exists, and critiquing systems that allow the selection of Condorcet losers. A variety of voting mechanisms are evaluated using the 2016 thermometer scores: Condorcet voting, plurality, Borda, (single winner) Hare, Coombs, range voting, and approval voting. We conclude that the essential problem with the existing voting procedure—Electoral College runoff of primary winners of two major parties—is that it (demonstrably) allows the selection of a Condorcet loser.

Electoral Majorities, Political Parties, and Collective Representation

2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (9) ◽  
pp. 1104-1131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael D. McDonald ◽  
Ian Budge ◽  
Robin E. Best
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Condorcet Winner ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Policy Position ◽  
Democratic Process ◽  
Collective Representation ◽  
Comparative Inquiry

In practice, democracies privilege plurality parties. Theories of the democratic process challenge the democratic credentials of this practice. Abstract social choice theory wonders whether an electoral majority even exists. A more optimistic line of argument, prominent in research on collective representation, assumes that the policy position of the median voter embodies the majority electoral preference. The conflict between what democracies actually do and what two leading theories of the democratic process say calls for a comparative inquiry into electoral majoritarianism. For each of a dozen countries, the authors ask whether any political party commands a predominant majoritarian position among voters—that is, is a Condorcet winner—and, if so, which party it is. They find that a Condorcet winning party exists in all 12 countries and that the plurality party can lay more claim to representing the popular majority than the left—right median party. These findings have important implications for the study of democratic representation, which the authors consider in their conclusions.

The Problem of Strategic Behavior under Approval Voting

1984 ◽  
Vol 78 (4) ◽  
pp. 952-958 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard G. Niemi
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Condorcet Winner ◽  
Approval Voting ◽  
Election Reform ◽  
Strategy Proof

Approval voting is being promoted as “the election reform of the 20th century” (Brams, 1980, p. 105), and indeed if voters' preferences are dichotomous, approval voting has some remarkable qualities: it is uniquely strategy-proof, a candidate wins if and only if he is a Condorcet winner, and voters have simple strategies that are at once sincere and sophisticated. However, all of these results depend on the existence of dichotomous preferences, a contrived and empirically unlikely assumption. Here I show that these virtues of approval voting are replaced by some rather undesirable features under more plausible assumptions. More fundamentally, rather than promoting “honest” behavior, as is sometimes implied, the existence of multiple sincere strategies almost begs voters to behave strategically. I also examine sophisticated approval voting and show that in the general case it need not pick a Condorcet alternative. Ironically, there is a condition under which Condorcet winners may always be picked, but for this to occur, voters sometimes have to vote for candidates of whom they disapprove.

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