A really general impossibility theorem

1982 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 493-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
General Impossibility

Assessment criteria for aggregate social welfare

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (12) ◽  
pp. 2358-2371
Author(s):  
S.A. Moskal'onov
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Mathematical Analysis ◽  
Exchange Economy ◽  
Assessment Criteria ◽  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
New Approaches ◽  
History Of Development ◽  
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem ◽  
History Of

Subject. The article addresses the history of development and provides the criticism of existing criteria for aggregate social welfare (on the simple exchange economy (the Edgeworth box) case). Objectives. The purpose is to develop a unique classification of criteria to assess the aggregate social welfare. Methods. The study draws on methods of logical and mathematical analysis. Results. The paper considers strong, strict and weak versions of the Pareto, Kaldor, Hicks, Scitovsky, and Samuelson criteria, introduces the notion of equivalence and constructs orderings by Pareto, Kaldor, Hicks, Scitovsky, and Samuelson. The Pareto and Samuelson's criteria are transitive, however, not complete. The Kaldor, Hicks, Scitovsky citeria are not transitive in the general case. Conclusions. The lack of an ideal social welfare criterion is the consequence of the Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, and of the group of impossibility theorems in economics. It is necessary to develop new approaches to the assessment of aggregate welfare.

An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam M. Brandenburger ◽  
H. Jerome Keisler
Keyword(s):  
Impossibility Theorem

A Comment on Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alec Sandroni ◽  
Alvaro Sandroni
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Function ◽  
Social Preference ◽  
Social Choice Function ◽  
Individual Preference ◽  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Preference Order ◽  
Individual Choice ◽  
Choice Functions ◽  
Preference Orders

AbstractArrow (1950) famously showed the impossibility of aggregating individual preference orders into a social preference order (together with basic desiderata). This paper shows that it is possible to aggregate individual choice functions, that satisfy almost any condition weaker than WARP, into a social choice function that satisfy the same condition (and also Arrow’s desiderata).

scholarly journals An impossibility theorem for matching problems

2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shohei Takagi ◽  
Shigehiro Serizawa
Keyword(s):  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Matching Problems
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document