On intuitionistic modal epistemic logic

Justification as Ignorance offers an original account of epistemic justification as both non-factive and luminous that vindicates core internalist intuitions, without construing justification as an internal condition. The account conceives of justification, in its doxastic and propositional varieties, as a kind of epistemic possibility of knowing, and of being in a position to know, respectively. It thus contrasts with other recently proposed views that characterize justification in terms of the metaphysical possibility of knowing. In developing his account, Rosenkranz devises a suitable non-normal multi-modal epistemic logic for knowledge and being in a position to know that respects the finding that these notions create hyperintensional contexts, defends his conception of justification against well-known anti-luminosity arguments, shows that the account allows for fruitful applications and principled solutions to the lottery and preface paradoxes, and provides a metaphysics of justification, and of its varying degrees of strength, that is compatible with core assumptions of the knowledge-first approach and disjunctivist conceptions of mental states.

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Temporalizing Modal Epistemic Logic

Logical Foundations of Computer Science - Lecture Notes in Computer Science ◽

10.1007/978-3-642-35722-0_26 ◽

2013 ◽

pp. 359-371 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Ren-June Wang

Keyword(s):

Epistemic Logic ◽

Modal Epistemic Logic

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Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Reasoning about Preference Dynamics ◽

10.1007/978-94-007-1344-4_2 ◽

2011 ◽

pp. 19-29

Author(s):

Fenrong Liu

Keyword(s):

Epistemic Logic ◽

Dynamic Epistemic Logic

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Introducing Justification into Epistemic Logic

Journal of Logic and Computation ◽

10.1093/logcom/exi053 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 15 (6) ◽

pp. 1059-1073 ◽

Cited By ~ 78

Author(s):

Sergei Artemov ◽

Elena Nogina

Keyword(s):

Epistemic Logic

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INTERPERSONAL COORDINATION AND EPISTEMIC SUPPORT FOR INTENTIONS WITH WE-CONTENT

Economics and Philosophy ◽

10.1017/s0266267110000404 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 26 (3) ◽

pp. 345-367 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Olivier Roy

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Epistemic Logic ◽

The Other ◽

Interpersonal Coordination ◽

Epistemic Game Theory ◽

Cast Doubt ◽

Alternative Set

In this paper I study intentions of the form ‘I intend that we . . .’, that is, intentions with a we-content, and their role in interpersonal coordination. I focus on the notion of epistemic support for such intentions. Using tools from epistemic game theory and epistemic logic, I cast doubt on whether such support guarantees the other agents' conditional mediation in the achievement of such intentions, something that appears important if intentions with a we-content are to count as genuine intentions. I then formulate a stronger version of epistemic support, one that does indeed ensure the required mediation, but I then argue that it rests on excessively strong informational conditions. In view of this I provide an alternative set of conditions that are jointly sufficient for coordination in games, and I argue that these conditions constitute a plausible alternative to the proposed notion of epistemic support.

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