Risk aversion and rent-seeking: An extension and some experimental evidence

Public Choice ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward L. Millner ◽  
Michael D. Pratt
Author(s):  
Baptiste Massenot ◽  
Maria Maraki ◽  
Christian Thöni

Abstract We investigate the effects of fee-shifting in an experimental litigation game. In our setup, a defendant may cause harm to a plaintiff. The defendant can take precautions to lower the probability of harm at a personal cost. In case of harm, the parties go to court, where the winner is determined by a rent-seeking contest. We compare two fee-shifting rules: under the American rule each party bears its own litigation costs; under the English rule the loser has to reimburse the winner’s expenses. We test the hypothesis that the English rule leads to higher litigation spending but also to higher care compared to the American rule. The experimental results largely support the predictions: fee-shifting leads to higher litigation spending, which motivates higher levels of care. When the parties are offered the possibility to settle their dispute out of court, fee-shifting leads to even higher litigation spending in court, but it neither affects the settlement rate nor care.


2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tanja Hörtnagl ◽  
Rudolf Kerschbamer ◽  
Rudi Stracke ◽  
Uwe Sunde

1999 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard J. Allard
Keyword(s):  

Public Choice ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 145 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 339-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas Treich
Keyword(s):  

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 187-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pamela Schmitt ◽  
Robert Shupp ◽  
Kurtis Swope ◽  
John Cadigan

2018 ◽  
Vol 64 (8) ◽  
pp. 3896-3910 ◽  
Author(s):  
Soo Hong Chew ◽  
Junjian Yi ◽  
Junsen Zhang ◽  
Songfa Zhong

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