The impact of multimarket contact on the strategic behavior of firms

Author(s):  
Silke Neubauer
Author(s):  
Jingchuan Zhang ◽  
Gang Chen ◽  
Zaiming Liu

We study an emerging computer network model of delayed observations in which the system is unobservable for the customers at their arrival instants, but after a while, they are informed about their current positions and they may renege. We develop a queueing-game-theoretic vacation model to explore customers' equilibrium strategy, stationary system behavior and social welfare based on a reward-cost structure. Our main results are as follows. First, we determine a closed form of the customers' equilibrium strategy, the expected net benefit of a customer and social welfare in the service system. Second, extensive numerical experiments that demonstrate the effect of vacation rate θ and system announcement rate δ on the equilibrium strategy and social welfare. We find that the impact of announcement rate δ is greater than vacation rate θ in some cases. Finally, we show that the equilibrium strategy can give customers more information and reduce the cost of waiting. Moreover, our results can also provide more precise information to the system administrators.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 357-369 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Mamavi ◽  
Olivier Meier ◽  
Romain Zerbib

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study how networks may influence the awarding of a contract. In particular, the authors explore strategic networks originating from cooperative relationships. Design/methodology/approach Based on notices of contracts awarded in the French public sector, the authors identified 10,377 partnership relations within 4,242 strategic alliances. The authors represented the system of relations in a graph. The authors used the networks depicted to measure a set of relational properties and build a structural equation model (partial least squared-path modeling). Findings The results highlight two important elements. First, the authors reveal the impact of the strength of weak and strong ties on contract awarding. Second, the authors show that the strength of weak ties is magnified by lead partners. Originality/value The findings provide insight into strategic behavior that can influence awarding contract. The authors also provide public principals with new means to improve their partner relations.


2000 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 9-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sudha Krishnaswami ◽  
Venkat Subramaniam

Conservation ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 331-360
Author(s):  
Charles Perrings

The conservation of ecosystems that either span national jurisdictions or extend beyond areas of national jurisdiction requires the establishment of governance mechanisms that operate above national governments, and hence that involve some cession of national sovereignty. This involves the coordination of national action, usually through the negotiation of bilateral or multilateral agreements. Chapter 14 considers the problem of conservation across national jurisdictions, focusing on ecosystems that span jurisdictions, migratory species, and the international movement of pests and pathogens as an incidental effect of trade and travel. It explores the impact of strategic behavior on the effectiveness of multilateral agreements, and the institutions developed to supply transboundary public goods such as climate mitigation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (12) ◽  
pp. 4696-4733 ◽  
Author(s):  
André F Silva

Abstract This paper examines whether banks strategically incorporate their competitors’ liquidity mismatch policies when determining their own and the impact of these collective decisions on financial stability. Using a novel identification strategy exploiting the presence of partially overlapping peer groups, I show that banks’ liquidity transformation activity is driven by that of their peers. These correlated decisions are concentrated on the asset side of riskier banks and are asymmetric, with mimicking occurring only when competitors take more risk. Accordingly, this strategic behavior increases banks’ default risk and overall systemic risk, highlighting the importance of regulating liquidity risk from a macroprudential perspective. ReceivedMay 4, 2016; editorial decision January 1, 2019 by Editor Philip Strahan. Author has furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.


SIMULATION ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 179-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew J. Collins ◽  
Erika Frydenlund

Researchers tend to model people as individuals rather than as members of groups. This approach diminishes the impact of altruism and other group-supporting behaviors. For example, walkers may move slower than their capability to retain group cohesion. Current modeling approaches to capture group formation and dynamics lack the strategic elements required to model the complexity of human decision-making. Game theory provides a mechanism to introduce this strategic behavior. This article investigates strategic group formation through the introduction of cooperative game theory techniques into an agent-based model and simulation (ABMS). It shows some empirical results from this introduction. The approach requires looking at the Core instead of the more common Nash Equilibrium. The simulation outputs show some agents forming a large dominant group, much like a real-world mob. The model and results are relevant to policymakers trying to understand how humans navigate an environment through strategic social interactions.


Author(s):  
Odd Godal ◽  
Frode Meland

Abstract The literature on emissions trading and strategic behavior under the Kyoto Protocol typically claims that a sellers' cartel featuring countries of the former Soviet Union can be quite profitable for its members. Using a Cournot-type quota exchange model, we show that this conclusion is sensitive to the assumption that large permit buyers, like the EU and Japan, are supposed to behave as price takers. Our result is driven by the same mechanisms as those found in Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983). We also discuss alternative models of permit exchange.


2016 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fariss T Mousa ◽  
Sang Kyun Kim ◽  
Mathew Rutherford

Purpose This study explores the role of the top management team (TMT) in determining whether IPO firms in high-tech industry will engage in acquisitions during the post-IPO period Design/methodology/approach We collect IPO and TMT data from firm prospectuses, and acquisition and financial data from SDC Platinum and Compustat, respectively. Poisson regression analysis is applied to test the effect of TMT characteristics on acquisition activity. Findings Using 135 IPO firms, we find evidence that TMT composition directly influences acquisition activity of IPO firms during the post-IPO period. Specifically, we find that TMT experience serving as members other firms’ boards and TMT experience in senior level management positions are both positively associated with acquisition activity. TMTs with prior IPO experience and TMTs with longer organizational tenures are negatively associated with acquisition activity. Originality/value This study is among the first to examine the impact of TMT demography on newly public firms’ acquisition activity. In doing so, it adds meaningfully to our understanding of the factors driving such firms’ strategic behavior.


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