Design of Key Establishment Protocol Using One-Way Functions to Avert insider-replay Attack

Author(s):  
Mounita Saha ◽  
Dipanwita RoyChowdhury
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongji Wang ◽  
Heinrich Dinkel ◽  
Shuai Wang ◽  
Yanmin Qian ◽  
Kai Yu

Author(s):  
Anderson R. Avila ◽  
Jahangir Alam ◽  
Douglas O’Shaughnessy ◽  
Tiago H. Falk

Author(s):  
Ashish Joshi ◽  
Amar Kumar Mohapatra

Background & Objective: Cryptographic protocols had been evident method for ensuring con dentiality, Integrity and authentication in various digital communication systems. However the validation and analysis of such cryptographic protocols was limited to usage of formal mathematical models until few years back. Methods: In this paper, various popular cryptographic protocols have been studied. Some of these protocols (PAP, CHAP, and EAP) achieve security goals in peer to peer communication while others (RADIUS, DIAMETER and Kerberos) can work in multiparty environment. These protocols were validated and analysed over two popular security validation and analysis tools AVISPA and Scyther. The protocols were written according to their documentation using the HLPSL and SPDL for analysis over AVISPA and Scyther respectively. The results of these tools were analysed to nd the possible attack an each protocol. Afterwards The execution time analysis of the protocols were done by repeating the experiment for multiple iterations over the command line versions of these tools.As the literature review suggested, this research also validates that using password based protocols (PAP) is faster in terms of execution time as compared to other methods, Usage of nonces tackles the replay attack and DIAMETER is secure than RADIUS. Results and Conclusion: The results also showed us that DIAMETER is faster than RADIUS. Though Kerberos protocol was found to safe, the results tell us that it is compromisable under particular circumstances.


Symmetry ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 332
Author(s):  
Jorge Martínez Carracedo ◽  
Adriana Suárez Corona

In this paper, we analyze the security of a group key establishment scheme proposed by López-Ramos et al. This proposal aims at allowing a group of users to agree on a common key. We present several attacks against the security of the proposed protocol. In particular, an active attack is presented, and it is also proved that the protocol does not provide forward secrecy.


Author(s):  
Meiran Galis ◽  
Tomislav Unkasevic ◽  
Milan Milosavljevic ◽  
Zoran Banjac ◽  
Predrag Milosav
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