scholarly journals Algorithms for Omega-Regular Games with Imperfect Information

2006 ◽  
pp. 287-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krishnendu Chatterjee ◽  
Laurent Doyen ◽  
Thomas A. Henzinger ◽  
Jean-François Raskin
Keyword(s):  
Imperfect Information

Economic models of Environment monitoring under imperfect information and high Costs

2014 ◽  
pp. 99-122
Author(s):  
M. Levin ◽  
K. Matrosova
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Monitoring ◽  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Environmental Economics ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Central Element ◽  
Economic Models ◽  
Environment Monitoring ◽  
Nature Protection ◽  
Protection Measures ◽  
Effective System

The paper considers monitoring of environmental change as the central element of environmental regulation. Monitoring, as each kind of principalagent relations, easily gives rise to corruptive behavior. In the paper we analyze economic models of environmental monitoring with high costs, incomplete information and corruption. These models should be the elements of environmental economics and are needed to create an effective system of nature protection measures.

strategi dalam pengambilan keputusan

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suci Handayani Handayani ◽  
Hade Afriansyah
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Administrative Process ◽  
Left Behind ◽  
Information Time ◽  
Complex Matter ◽  
General Individuals

Decision making is one element of economic value, especially in the era of globalization, and if it is not acceptable in the decision making process, we will be left behind. According to Robins, (2003: 173), Salusu, (2000: 47), and Razik and Swanson, (1995: 476) say that decision making can be interpreted as a process of choosing a number of alternatives, how to act in accordance with concepts, or rules in solving problems to achieve individual or group goals that have been formulated using a number of specific techniques, approaches and methods and achieve optimal levels of acceptance.Decision making in organizations whether a decision is made for a person or group, the nature of the decision is often determined by rules, policies, prescribed, instructions that have been derived or practices that apply. To understand decision making within the organization it is useful to view decision making as part of the overall administrative process. In general, individuals tend to use simple strategies, even if in any complex matter, to get the desired solution, because the solution is limited by imperfect information, time and costs, limited thinking and psychological stress experienced by decision makers.

The Law's Promise - An Experiment with Centralized Sanctions \& Imperfect Information

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristoffel R. Grechenig ◽  
Sven Fischer ◽  
Nicolas Meier
Keyword(s):  
Imperfect Information

scholarly journals The Value of Lies in a Power-to-Take Game with Imperfect Information

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Damien Besancenot ◽  
Delphine Dubart ◽  
Radu Vranceanu
Keyword(s):  
Imperfect Information

scholarly journals A New Approach to Group Multi-Objective Optimization under Imperfect Information and Its Application to Project Portfolio Optimization

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (10) ◽  
pp. 4575
Author(s):  
Eduardo Fernández ◽  
Nelson Rangel-Valdez ◽  
Laura Cruz-Reyes ◽  
Claudia Gomez-Santillan
Keyword(s):  
Portfolio Optimization ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Project Portfolio ◽  
Objective Functions ◽  
Multi Objective Optimization ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Multi Objective ◽  
Group Member

This paper addresses group multi-objective optimization under a new perspective. For each point in the feasible decision set, satisfaction or dissatisfaction from each group member is determined by a multi-criteria ordinal classification approach, based on comparing solutions with a limiting boundary between classes “unsatisfactory” and “satisfactory”. The whole group satisfaction can be maximized, finding solutions as close as possible to the ideal consensus. The group moderator is in charge of making the final decision, finding the best compromise between the collective satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Imperfect information on values of objective functions, required and available resources, and decision model parameters are handled by using interval numbers. Two different kinds of multi-criteria decision models are considered: (i) an interval outranking approach and (ii) an interval weighted-sum value function. The proposal is more general than other approaches to group multi-objective optimization since (a) some (even all) objective values may be not the same for different DMs; (b) each group member may consider their own set of objective functions and constraints; (c) objective values may be imprecise or uncertain; (d) imperfect information on resources availability and requirements may be handled; (e) each group member may have their own perception about the availability of resources and the requirement of resources per activity. An important application of the new approach is collective multi-objective project portfolio optimization. This is illustrated by solving a real size group many-objective project portfolio optimization problem using evolutionary computation tools.

scholarly journals Information Use and the Condorcet Jury Theorem

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (10) ◽  
pp. 1098
Author(s):  
Keiichi Morimoto
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Information Use ◽  
Information Aggregation ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
Strategic Complementarity ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Jury Theorem

Using a simple model of a coordination game, this paper explores how the information use of individuals affects an optimal committee size. Although enlarging the committee promotes information aggregation, it also stimulates the members’ coordination motive and distorts their voting behavior through higher-order beliefs. On the determination of a finite optimal committee size, the direction and degree of strategic interactions matter. When the strategic complementarity among members is strong, a finite optimal committee size exists. In contrast, it does not exist under strategic substitution. This mechanism is applied to the design of monetary policy committees in a New Keynesian model in which a committee conducts monetary policy under imperfect information.

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