Side Channel Attacks Against HMACs Based on Block-Cipher Based Hash Functions

2006 ◽  
pp. 432-443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katsuyuki Okeya
Keyword(s):  
Block Cipher ◽  
Hash Functions ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attacks

scholarly journals Variety of Scalable Shuffling Countermeasures against Side Channel Attacks

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikita Veshchikov ◽  
Stephane Fernandes Medeiros ◽  
Liran Lerman
Keyword(s):  
Block Cipher ◽  
Fixed Number ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Small Data ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Side Channel Analysis ◽  
Cryptographic System ◽  
Channel Analysis ◽  
Iot Devices ◽  
Time Overhead

IoT devices have very strong requirements on all the resources such as memory, randomness, energy and execution time. This paper proposes a number of scalable shuffling techniques as countermeasures against side channel analysis. Some extensions of an existing technique called Random Start Index (RSI) are suggested in this paper. Moreover, two new shuffling techniques Reverse Shuffle (RS) and Sweep Swap Shuffle (SSS) are described within their possible extensions. Extensions of RSI, RS and SSS might be implemented in a constrained environment with a small data and time overhead. Each of them might be implemented using different amount of randomness and thus, might be fine-tuned according to requirements and constraints of a cryptographic system such as time, memory, available number of random bits, etc. RSI, RS, SSS and their extensions are described using SubBytes operation of AES-128 block cipher as an example, but they might be used with different operations of AES as well as with other algorithms. This paper also analyses RSI, RS and SSS by comparing their properties such as number of total permutations that might be generated using a fixed number of random bits, data complexity, time overhead and evaluates their resistance against some known side-channel attacks such as correlation power analysis and template attack. Several of proposed shuffling schemes are implemented on a 8-bit microcontroller that uses them to shuffle the first and the last rounds of AES-128.  

The Hardware Implementation of a Lightweight Block Cipher Algorithm and a Message Authentication Algorithm

2012 ◽  
Vol 546-547 ◽  
pp. 1489-1494
Author(s):  
Yi Kun Hu ◽  
Zun Yang Qin
Keyword(s):  
Hardware Implementation ◽  
Block Cipher ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Message Authentication ◽  
Side Channel Attack ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Processing Efficiency ◽  
New Family ◽  
Lightweight Block Cipher ◽  
Lightweight Cipher

Among the block cipher algorithms, AES or DES is an excellent and preferred choice for most block cipher applications. But AES and DES are not very suitable for hardware implementation because of the high cost that they require large areas of routing and the processing efficiency is low, relatively. So lightweight cipher algorithms come into beings, among which PRESENT is very competitive. Along with the structure of a message authentication algorithm ALRED, a new family of Tunable Lightweight MAC based on PRESENT is proposed, that is TuLP. However, PRESENT is not able to resist side channel attack, so is TuLP, of course. For the above reason, in this paper, we provide an improvement of PRESENT by inserting random dummy cycles as well as shuffling to strengthen the security of PRESENT against side channel attacks. We will implement PRESENT and TuLP in Verilog and do simulation on Xilinx ISim platform. At last, we would like to provide the power analyzing of Xilinx XPower.

scholarly journals Practical Evaluation of FSE 2016 Customized Encoding Countermeasure

2017 ◽  
pp. 108-129
Author(s):  
Shivam Bhasin ◽  
Dirmanto Jap ◽  
Thomas Peyrin
Keyword(s):  
Block Cipher ◽  
General Purpose ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Noise Variance ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
General Observation ◽  
Encoding Scheme ◽  
Practical Evaluation ◽  
Security Properties ◽  
Optimal Encoding

To protect against side-channel attacks, many countermeasures have been proposed. A novel customized encoding countermeasure was published in FSE 2016. Customized encoding exploits knowledge of the profiled leakage of the device to construct an optimal encoding and minimize the overall side-channel leakage. This technique was originally applied on a basic table look-up. In this paper, we implement a full block cipher with customized encoding countermeasure and investigate its security under simulated and practical setting for a general purpose microcontroller. Under simulated setting, we can verify that customized encoding shows strong security properties under proper assumption of leakage estimation and noise variance. However, in practical setting, our general observation is that the side-channel leakage will mostly be present even if the encoding scheme is applied, highlighting some limitation of the approach. The results are supported by experiments on 8-bit AVR and 32-bit ARM microcontroller.

scholarly journals Modeling Soft Analytical Side-Channel Attacks from a Coding Theory Viewpoint

2020 ◽  
pp. 209-238
Author(s):  
Qian Guo ◽  
Vincent Grosso ◽  
François-Xavier Standaert ◽  
Olivier Bronchain
Keyword(s):  
Coding Theory ◽  
Block Cipher ◽  
Belief Propagation ◽  
Divide And Conquer ◽  
Worst Case Analysis ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Security Proofs ◽  
Open Question

One important open question in side-channel analysis is to find out whether all the leakage samples in an implementation can be exploited by an adversary, as suggested by masking security proofs. For attacks exploiting a divide-and-conquer strategy, the answer is negative: only the leakages corresponding to the first/last rounds of a block cipher can be exploited. Soft Analytical Side-Channel Attacks (SASCA) have been introduced as a powerful solution to mitigate this limitation. They represent the target implementation and its leakages as a code (similar to a Low Density Parity Check code) that is decoded thanks to belief propagation. Previous works have shown the low data complexities that SASCA can reach in practice. In this paper, we revisit these attacks by modeling them with a variation of the Random Probing Model used in masking security proofs, that we denote as the Local Random Probing Model (LRPM). Our study establishes interesting connections between this model and the erasure channel used in coding theory, leading to the following benefits. First, the LRPM allows bounding the security of concrete implementations against SASCA in a fast and intuitive manner. We use it in order to confirm that the leakage of any operation in a block cipher can be exploited, although the leakages of external operations dominate in known-plaintext/ciphertext attack scenarios. Second, we show that the LRPM is a tool of choice for the (nearly worst-case) analysis of masked implementations in the noisy leakage model, taking advantage of all the operations performed, and leading to new tradeoffs between their amount of randomness and physical noise level. Third, we show that it can considerably speed up the evaluation of other countermeasures such as shuffling.

scholarly journals Spook: Sponge-Based Leakage-Resistant Authenticated Encryption with a Masked Tweakable Block Cipher

2020 ◽  
pp. 295-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide Bellizia ◽  
Francesco Berti ◽  
Olivier Bronchain ◽  
Gaëtan Cassiers ◽  
Sébastien Duval ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Block Cipher ◽  
Block Size ◽  
Minimum Cost ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Authenticated Encryption ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Mode Of Operation ◽  
Channel Analysis ◽  
Tweakable Block Cipher ◽  
Software And Hardware

This paper defines Spook: a sponge-based authenticated encryption with associated data algorithm. It is primarily designed to provide security against side-channel attacks at a low energy cost. For this purpose, Spook is mixing a leakageresistant mode of operation with bitslice ciphers enabling efficient and low latency implementations. The leakage-resistant mode of operation leverages a re-keying function to prevent differential side-channel analysis, a duplex sponge construction to efficiently process the data, and a tag verification based on a Tweakable Block Cipher (TBC) providing strong data integrity guarantees in the presence of leakages. The underlying bitslice ciphers are optimized for the masking countermeasures against side-channel attacks. Spook is an efficient single-pass algorithm. It ensures state-of-the-art black box security with several prominent features: (i) nonce misuse-resilience, (ii) beyond-birthday security with respect to the TBC block size, and (iii) multiuser security at minimum cost with a public tweak. Besides the specifications and design rationale, we provide first software and hardware implementation results of (unprotected) Spook which confirm the limited overheads that the use of two primitives sharing internal components imply. We also show that the integrity of Spook with leakage, so far analyzed with unbounded leakages for the duplex sponge and a strongly protected TBC modeled as leak-free, can be proven with a much weaker unpredictability assumption for the TBC. We finally discuss external cryptanalysis results and tweaks to improve both the security margins and efficiency of Spook.

Lightweight Implementation of the LowMC Block Cipher Protected Against Side-Channel Attacks

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javad Bahrami ◽  
Viet B. Dang ◽  
Abubakr Abdulgadir ◽  
Khaled N. Khasawneh ◽  
Jens-Peter Kaps ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Block Cipher ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attacks

Scan-Based Side-Channel Attack on the Camellia Block Cipher Using Scan Signatures

2015 ◽  
Vol E98.A (12) ◽  
pp. 2547-2555 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huiqian JIANG ◽  
Mika FUJISHIRO ◽  
Hirokazu KODERA ◽  
Masao YANAGISAWA ◽  
Nozomu TOGAWA
Keyword(s):  
Block Cipher ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attack
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