An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Comparison of Two Double-Auction Market Designs

2006 ◽  
pp. 101-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Phelps ◽  
Simon Parsons ◽  
Peter McBurney
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Double Auction ◽  
Auction Market ◽  
Game Theoretic

scholarly journals Controlling monopoly power in a double‐auction market experiment

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Attanasi ◽  
Kene Boun My ◽  
Andrea Guido ◽  
Mathieu Lefebvre
Keyword(s):  
Monopoly Power ◽  
Double Auction ◽  
Auction Market ◽  
Market Experiment

scholarly journals Performance Evaluation for Transactive Energy Systems Using Double-Auction Market

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 4128-4137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianming Lian ◽  
Huiying Ren ◽  
Yannan Sun ◽  
Donald J. Hammerstrom
Keyword(s):  
Performance Evaluation ◽  
Energy Systems ◽  
Double Auction ◽  
Auction Market ◽  
Transactive Energy

The philosophical interpretation of language game theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Zangwill
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Language Game ◽  
Linguistic Meaning ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Philosophical Interpretation ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

Abstract I give an informal presentation of the evolutionary game theoretic approach to the conventions that constitute linguistic meaning. The aim is to give a philosophical interpretation of the project, which accounts for the role of game theoretic mathematics in explaining linguistic phenomena. I articulate the main virtue of this sort of account, which is its psychological economy, and I point to the casual mechanisms that are the ground of the application of evolutionary game theory to linguistic phenomena. Lastly, I consider the objection that the account cannot explain predication, logic, and compositionality.

Minimal Intelligence Agents in Double Auction Markets with Speculators

2011 ◽  
pp. 79-98
Author(s):  
Senlin Wu ◽  
Siddhartha Bhattacharyya
Keyword(s):  
Market Efficiency ◽  
Double Auction ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Agent Based Model ◽  
Market Conditions ◽  
Market Prices ◽  
Auction Markets ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Auction Market

This chapter explores the minimal intelligence conditions for traders in a general double auction market with speculation activities. Using an agent-based model, it is shown that when traders and speculators play together under general market curve settings, zero-intelligent plus (ZIP) is still a sufficient condition for market prices to converge to the equilibrium. At the same time, market efficiency is lowered as the number of speculators increase. The experiments demonstrate that the equilibrium of a double auction market is an interactive result of the intelligence of the traders and other factors such as the type of the players and market conditions. This research fills in an important gap in the literature, and strengthens Cliff and Bruten’s (1997) declaration that zero is not enough for a double auction market.

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