Generalized Knapsack Solvers for Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions: Analysis and Application to Computational Resource Allocation

2006 ◽  
pp. 73-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terence Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Combinatorial Auctions ◽  
Computational Resource

Online Combinatorial Auctions for Resource Allocation With Supply Costs and Capacity Limits

2020 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 655-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoqi Tan ◽  
Alberto Leon-Garcia ◽  
Yuan Wu ◽  
Danny H. K. Tsang
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Combinatorial Auctions ◽  
Capacity Limits ◽  
Supply Costs

Combinatorial Auctions

2013 ◽  
pp. 107-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Porter ◽  
Stephen Rassenti ◽  
David Munro
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Space Shuttle ◽  
Combinatorial Auctions ◽  
Combinatorial Auction ◽  
Valuable Resource ◽  
Individual Values ◽  
Transportation Services ◽  
Spectrum Auctions ◽  
Auction Mechanisms ◽  
Efficient Allocations

Traditional auctions struggle to achieve efficient allocations in multi-resource environments where individual resources are complements (the value of obtaining a package of items is worth more than the sum of the unbundled individual values) or they are substitutes. For this reason, Combinatorial Auctions are valuable resource allocation mechanisms in a host of environments. These environments include, but are not limited to, spectrum auctions, procurement of transportation services, exchange of pollution credits, and the allocation of space shuttle resources. This chapter provides a summary of several important combinatorial auction mechanisms. For each mechanism examined we highlight the strengths, weaknesses, and the environments for which they are well suited. In addition, the chapter provides examples of how these mechanisms have been used by business and government to gain efficiency and revenue in these complex resource allocation environments.

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