scholarly journals Representational Content and the Reciprocal Interplay of Agent and Environment

2005 ◽  
pp. 270-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tibor Bosse ◽  
Catholijn M. Jonker ◽  
Jan Treur
Keyword(s):  
Representational Content

Reply to Guy Longworth

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Representational Content ◽  
Main Issue ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Half Century ◽  
The Law

Starting in about 2004 John McDowell and I have engaged in a debate. There have been a number of public exchanges, and quite a few more private ones. In my view, some progress has been made (though the debate continues). Others may disagree (the ‘law of diminishing fleas’). I, at any rate, think I have learned from him. Guy Longworth does us both the honour of comparing our debate to one a half century earlier between J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson. Honours apart, I think he has pointed to an illuminating connection between what I have long thought the main issue and another. If I had been asked what question McDowell and I had been (most centrally) debating, I would have said: it is the question how enjoying an experience of perceiving (e.g., of seeing) can make judging one thing or another intelligibly rational (that last term lifted from McDowell). I have a story to tell which is, in one key respect, sparser than his. To telegraph, he thinks such experience must have (representational) content. I think, not just that it needn’t, but that if it did, we would be cut off from ...

Reply to Keith A. Wilson

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Representational Content ◽  
The Senses

In my essay, ‘The Silence of the Senses’ (2004, revised 2013) I argued that perceptual experience has no representational content, or at least none if you exclude the content of a perceiver’s, or experiencer’s responses to his experience, e.g., in a case of perceiving, recognizing...

Functions for Representation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Shea
Keyword(s):  
Representational Content ◽  
Good Basis

What kind of functions are suited for grounding representational content? Do they derive from behaviour that is robust and apparently goal-directed, or from consequence etiology? Rather than choosing between these two elements the account here combines them: ‘robust outcome functions’ combine with ‘stabilized functions’ to form ‘task functions’, which are the functions-for-representation that offer a good basis for fixing content. Task functions allow space for contents on which they are based to have a distinctive kind of explanatory purchase.

In Defense of Perceptual Content

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanna Schellenberg
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Representational Content ◽  
Perceptual Content ◽  
Explanatory Role ◽  
Relational Understanding ◽  
The Way

Chapter 5 takes a step back and traces the way in which excessive demands on the notion of perceptual content invite an austere relationalist account of perception. It argues that any account that acknowledges the role of discriminatory, selective capacities in perception must acknowledge that perceptual states have representational content. The chapter shows that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with representationalism. Most objections to the thesis that perceptual experience has representational content apply only to austere representationalist accounts, that is, accounts on which perceptual relations to the environment play no explanatory role. By arguing that perceptual relations and perceptual content are mutually dependent the chapter shows how Fregean particularism can avoid the pitfalls of both austere representationalism and austere relationalism. With relationalists, Fregean particularism argues that perception is constitutively relational, but with representationalists it argues that it is constitutively representational.

The Metaphysics of Representation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Robert G. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Representational Content ◽  
Physical World ◽  
Degrees Of Belief ◽  
Public Language ◽  
Language And Thought ◽  
Final Layer ◽  
The World ◽  
Interactive Relationship ◽  
Compositional Interpretation ◽  
The One

What is representation? How do the more primitive aspects of our world come together to generate it? How do different kinds of representation relate to one another? This book identifies the metaphysical foundations for representational facts. The story told is in three parts. The most primitive layer of representation is the ‘aboutness’ of sensation/perception and intention/action, which are the two most basic modes in which an individual and the world interact. It is argued that we can understand how this kind of representation can exist in a fundamentally physical world so long as we have an independent, illuminating grip on functions and causation. The second layer of representation is the ‘aboutness’ of (degrees of) belief and desire, whose representational content goes far beyond the immediate perceptable and manipulable environment. It is argued that the correct belief/desire interpretation of an agent is the one which makes their action-guiding states, given their perceptual evidence, most rational. The final layer of representation is the ‘aboutness’ of words and sentences, human artefacts with representational content. It is argued that one can give an illuminating account of the conditions under which a compositional interpretation of a public language like English is correct by appeal to patterns emerging from the attitudes conventionally expressed by sentences. The three-layer metaphysics of representation resolves long-standing underdetermination puzzles, predicts and explains patterns in the way that concepts denote, and articulates a delicate interactive relationship between the foundations of language and thought.

scholarly journals Contents of Unconscious Color Perception

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Błażej Skrzypulec
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Color Perception ◽  
Representational Content ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Unconscious Perception ◽  
Theoretical Investigations ◽  
Significant Support

AbstractIn the contemporary discussions concerning unconscious perception it is not uncommon to postulate that content and phenomenal character are ‘orthogonal’, i.e., there is no type of content which is essentially conscious, but instead, every representational content can be either conscious or not. Furthermore, this is not merely treated as a thesis justified by theoretical investigations, but as supported by empirical considerations concerning the actual functioning of the human cognition. In this paper, I address unconscious color perception and argue for a negative thesis—that the main experimental paradigms used in studying unconscious color perception do not provide support for the position that conscious and unconscious color representations have the same type of content. More specifically, I claim that there is no significant support for the claim that unconscious vision categorically represents surface colors.

Semantic Structural Alignment of Neural Representational Spaces Enables Translation between English and Chinese Words

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (11) ◽  
pp. 1749-1759 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin D. Zinszer ◽  
Andrew J. Anderson ◽  
Olivia Kang ◽  
Thalia Wheatley ◽  
Rajeev D. S. Raizada
Keyword(s):  
Analogical Reasoning ◽  
Language Translation ◽  
Structural Alignment ◽  
Word Meaning ◽  
Representational Content ◽  
English Word ◽  
English Speakers ◽  
Native Languages ◽  
Neural Representations ◽  
High Level

Two sets of items can share the same underlying conceptual structure, while appearing unrelated at a surface level. Humans excel at recognizing and using alignments between such underlying structures in many domains of cognition, most notably in analogical reasoning. Here we show that structural alignment reveals how different people's neural representations of word meaning are preserved across different languages, such that patterns of brain activation can be used to translate words from one language to another. Groups of Chinese and English speakers underwent fMRI scanning while reading words in their respective native languages. Simply by aligning structures representing the two groups' neural semantic spaces, we successfully infer all seven Chinese–English word translations. Beyond language translation, conceptual structural alignment underlies many aspects of high-level cognition, and this work opens the door to deriving many such alignments directly from neural representational content.

scholarly journals Social Representations of the Environment in Press Media

2015 ◽  
Vol 25 (61) ◽  
pp. 261-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gislei Mocelin Polli ◽  
Brigido Vizeu Camargo
Keyword(s):  
Paradigm Shift ◽  
Social Representations ◽  
Representational Content ◽  
Environmental Issues ◽  
Paradigm Shifts ◽  
Qualitative Survey ◽  
The Press ◽  
Global Impacts ◽  
The Media ◽  
Over Time

Environmental issues are given prominence in the media and scientific circles. From the 60’s until early 2010 there were changes in the way people related to the environment, with a paradigm shift occurring regarding the environment. This study sought to identify the representational content disseminated by the press media on the environment in different periods. A qualitative survey was therefore conducted of documents, and data were obtained through texts published in a magazine with national circulation. The data were analyzed using the ALCESTE program with a Lexicographic Analysis. It was identified that the press media reflects the paradigm shifts, and publications dating from the late 60’s are compatible with the old paradigm, evolving over time, and are now compatible with the new environmental paradigm. The results indicate that currently the environment needs care in all its aspects and lack of care creates global impacts.

scholarly journals Prior expectations induce prestimulus sensory templates

2017 ◽  
Vol 114 (39) ◽  
pp. 10473-10478 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Kok ◽  
Pim Mostert ◽  
Floris P. de Lange
Keyword(s):  
Sensory Neurons ◽  
Temporal Resolution ◽  
Representational Content ◽  
Sensory Cortex ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Neural Signals ◽  
Neural Signal ◽  
Time Resolved ◽  
Sensory Inputs ◽  
Behavioral Improvement

Perception can be described as a process of inference, integrating bottom-up sensory inputs and top-down expectations. However, it is unclear how this process is neurally implemented. It has been proposed that expectations lead to prestimulus baseline increases in sensory neurons tuned to the expected stimulus, which in turn, affect the processing of subsequent stimuli. Recent fMRI studies have revealed stimulus-specific patterns of activation in sensory cortex as a result of expectation, but this method lacks the temporal resolution necessary to distinguish pre- from poststimulus processes. Here, we combined human magnetoencephalography (MEG) with multivariate decoding techniques to probe the representational content of neural signals in a time-resolved manner. We observed a representation of expected stimuli in the neural signal shortly before they were presented, showing that expectations indeed induce a preactivation of stimulus templates. The strength of these prestimulus expectation templates correlated with participants’ behavioral improvement when the expected feature was task-relevant. These results suggest a mechanism for how predictive perception can be neurally implemented.

scholarly journals A Roadmap for Understanding Memory: Decomposing Cognitive Processes into Operations and Representations

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosemary Cowell ◽  
Morgan Barense ◽  
Patrick Sadil
Keyword(s):  
Division Of Labor ◽  
Cognitive Functions ◽  
Declarative Memory ◽  
Behavioral Control ◽  
Representational Content ◽  
Neural Mechanism ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Medial Temporal Lobes ◽  
Pattern Completion ◽  
High Level

Thanks to patients Phineas Gage and Henry Molaison, we have long known that behavioral control depends on the frontal lobes, whereas declarative memory depends on the medial temporal lobes. For decades, cognitive functions – behavioral control, declarative memory – have served as labels for characterizing the division of labor in cortex. This approach has made enormous contributions to understanding how the brain enables the mind, providing a systems-level explanation of brain function that constrains lower-level investigations of neural mechanism. Today, the approach has evolved such that functional labels are often applied to brain networks rather than focal brain regions. Furthermore, the labels have diversified to include both broadly-defined cognitive functions (declarative memory, visual perception) and more circumscribed mental processes (recollection, familiarity, priming). We ask whether a process – a high-level mental phenomenon corresponding to an introspectively-identifiable cognitive event – is the most productive label for dissecting memory. For example, the process of recollection conflates a neurocomputational operation (pattern completion-based retrieval) with a class of representational content (associative, high-dimensional, episodic-like memories). Because a full theory of memory must identify operations and representations separately, and specify how they interact, we argue that processes like recollection constitute inadequate labels for characterizing neural mechanisms. Instead, we advocate considering the component operations and representations of mnemonic processes in isolation, when examining their neural underpinnings. For the neuroanatomical organization of memory, the evidence suggests that pattern completion is recapitulated widely across cortex, but the division of labor between cortical sites can be explained by representational content.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document