Calibration of Subjective Probability Judgments in a Naturalistic Setting

2001 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johnnie E.V. Johnson ◽  
Alistair C. Bruce
Keyword(s):  
Subjective Probability ◽  
Probability Judgments ◽  
Naturalistic Setting

scholarly journals The role of ANS acuity and numeracy for the calibration and the coherence of subjective probability judgments

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anders Winman ◽  
Peter Juslin ◽  
Marcus Lindskog ◽  
HÃ¥kan Nilsson ◽  
Neda Kerimi
Keyword(s):  
Subjective Probability ◽  
Probability Judgments

It can't happen to me … or can it? Conditional base rates affect subjective probability judgments.

1999 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 361-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carla C. Chandler ◽  
Leilani Greening ◽  
Leslie J. Robison ◽  
Laura Stoppelbein
Keyword(s):  
Subjective Probability ◽  
Probability Judgments ◽  
Base Rates

Developmental Change in Subjective Probability during Adolescence

1989 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 243-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoshiaki Nakajima ◽  
Hirohiko Ohta
Keyword(s):  
Subjective Probability ◽  
Developmental Change ◽  
Objective Probability ◽  
Probability Judgments ◽  
Japanese Adolescents ◽  
Probability Concept

The developmental change in subjective probability during adolescence, an important period for establishing the probability concept, was investigated. 75 Japanese adolescents, from 12 to 23 yr. of age, were asked to make probability judgments for a lottery under 15 conditions. Analysis showed that with increase in age their subjective probability came closer to the objective probability. Discussion of these results took into consideration recent studies on the development of the concept of probability.

scholarly journals When alternative hypotheses shape your beliefs: Context effects in probability judgments

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaohong Cai ◽  
Timothy Joseph Pleskac
Keyword(s):  
Subjective Probability ◽  
Context Effects ◽  
The Other ◽  
Similar Process ◽  
Probability Judgments ◽  
Support Theory ◽  
Alternative Hypotheses ◽  
Independence Assumptions

When people are asked to estimate the probability of an event occurring, they sometimes make different subjective probability (SP) judgments for different descriptions of the same event. This implies the evidence or support recruited to make SPs is based on the descriptions of the events (hypotheses) instead of the events themselves, as captured by Tversky and Koehler's (1994) support theory. However, is the support assigned to a hypothesis invariant, as support theory assumes? Here, across two studies where participants were asked to estimate the probability that an event would occur, we show that the support people recruit about the target hypothesis also depends on the other hypotheses under consideration. The first study shows that the presence of a distractor---a hypothesis objectively dominated by the target hypothesis---boosts the SP assigned to the target hypothesis. The second study shows that the presence of a resembler---a hypothesis that is objectively similar to the target hypothesis---detracts more from the SP assigned to the target hypothesis than the competing hypothesis. These context effects invalidate the regularity and the strong independence assumptions of support theory and more generally suggest a similar process that drives the construction of preference also underlies belief.

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