The English Auction with Differentiated Commodities

2000 ◽  
Vol 92 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Faruk Gul ◽  
Ennio Stacchetti
Keyword(s):  
English Auction ◽  
Differentiated Commodities

Timber Auctions in the Context of the Modern Auction Theory

2007 ◽  
pp. 86-94
Author(s):  
A. Manakov
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Auction Theory ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Theoretical Point ◽  
English Auction ◽  
Analysis And Evaluation

The article provides theoretical analysis and evaluation of the timber auctions reforms in Russia. The author shows that the mechanism of the "combined auctions", which functioned until recently, is more appropriate from the theoretical point of view (and from the point of view of the Russian practice) as compared to the officially approved format of the English auction.

A new English auction scheme using the bulletin board system

2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 408-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheng‐Chi Lee ◽  
Min‐Shiang Hwang ◽  
Chih‐Wei Lin
Keyword(s):  
Bulletin Board ◽  
English Auction ◽  
Bulletin Board System ◽  
Board System

scholarly journals Cheating in online auction – Towards explaining the popularity of English auction

2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mamata Jenamani ◽  
Yuhui Zhong ◽  
Bharat Bhargava
Keyword(s):  
Online Auction ◽  
English Auction

scholarly journals Single object auctions with interdependent values

2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (188) ◽  
pp. 125-169
Author(s):  
Dejan Trifunovic
Keyword(s):  
Single Object ◽  
English Auction ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Reserve Prices ◽  
Interdependent Values ◽  
Common Value Auctions ◽  
Expected Revenue

This paper reviews single object auctions when bidders? values of the object are interdependent. We will see how the auction forms could be ranked in terms of expected revenue when signals that bidders have about the value of the object are affiliated. In the discussion that follows we will deal with reserve prices and entry fees. Furthermore we will examine the conditions that have to be met for English auction with asymmetric bidders to allocate the object efficiently. Finally, common value auctions will be considered when all bidders have the same value for the object.

Bought-in at English auction

2021 ◽  
pp. 152-167
Author(s):  
Elisabetta Lazzaro ◽  
Bénédicte Miyamoto
Keyword(s):  
English Auction
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