Epistemic Conditions for Equilibrium in Beliefs without Independence

Oscar Volij

doi:10.1006/jeth.1996.0095

Epistemic Conditions for Equilibrium in Beliefs without Independence

Journal of Economic Theory ◽

10.1006/jeth.1996.0095 ◽

1996 ◽

Vol 70 (2) ◽

pp. 391-406 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Oscar Volij

Keyword(s):

Equilibrium In Beliefs

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Equilibrium in Beliefs under Uncertainty

Journal of Economic Theory ◽

10.1006/jeth.1996.0129 ◽

1996 ◽

Vol 71 (2) ◽

pp. 443-484 ◽

Cited By ~ 82

Author(s):

Kin Chung Lo

Keyword(s):

Equilibrium In Beliefs

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Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control ◽

10.1016/s0165-1889(99)00080-9 ◽

2001 ◽

Vol 25 (11) ◽

pp. 1801-1825 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Xiao Luo ◽

Chenghu Ma

Keyword(s):

Stable Equilibrium ◽

Perfect Information ◽

Extensive Games ◽

Equilibrium In Beliefs

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Equilibrium in beliefs under uncertainty

Uncertainty in Economic Theory ◽

10.4324/9780203358061_chapter_20 ◽

2010 ◽

pp. 483-521

Author(s):

Kin Chung Lo

Keyword(s):

Equilibrium In Beliefs

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Equilibrium in beliefs under uncertainty

Uncertainty in Economic Theory ◽

10.4324/9780203358061-26 ◽

2004 ◽

pp. 499-537

Keyword(s):

Equilibrium In Beliefs

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