Power of Voters and Domain of Preferences Where Voting by Committees Is Strategy-Proof

1995 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 599-608 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shigehiro Serizawa
Keyword(s):  
Is Strategy ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Voting By Committees

Sequential Preference Revelation in Incomplete Information Settings

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-147
Author(s):  
James Schummer ◽  
Rodrigo A. Velez
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Real World ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Allocation Rules ◽  
Is Strategy ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Simultaneous Move

Strategy-proof allocation rules incentivize truthfulness in simultaneous move games, but real world mechanisms sometimes elicit preferences sequentially. Surprisingly, even when the underlying rule is strategy-proof and nonbossy, sequential elicitation can yield equilibria where agents have a strict incentive to be untruthful. This occurs only under incomplete information, when an agent anticipates that truthful reporting would signal false private information about others’ preferences. We provide conditions ruling out this phenomenon, guaranteeing all equilibrium outcomes to be welfare-equivalent to truthful ones. (JEL C73, D45, D82, D83)

Large Electorates

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Balinski ◽  
Rida Laraki
Keyword(s):  
Ordered Set ◽  
Common Language ◽  
Is Strategy ◽  
Strategy Proof

This chapter emphasizes the simplification of majority-ranking, stating that an increased number of judges in the jury or voters in an electorate or use of simplified common language help to simplify majority-values of competitors or candidates. Ordered set grades help obtain majority-value by beginning with the majority-grade or the lower middlemost grade and following alternating grades. Unambiguous order among the competitors can be determined with certainty given an increased number of judges or voters and relatively few grades. The competitor’s majority-gauge, which is strategy-proof-in-grading, is explained with the help of a theorem. Upper, lower, and difference tie-breaking rules that are strategy-proof-in-grading share properties with the majority-gauge-ranking.

scholarly journals Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 (4) ◽  
pp. 1486-1529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabrielle Fack ◽  
Julien Grenet ◽  
Yinghua He
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Test Scores ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Student Preferences ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Is Strategy ◽  
Deferred Acceptance ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Novel Approaches

We propose novel approaches to estimating student preferences with data from matching mechanisms, especially the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance. Even if the mechanism is strategy-proof, assuming that students truthfully rank schools in applications may be restrictive. We show that when students are ranked strictly by some ex ante known priority index (e.g., test scores), stability is a plausible and weaker assumption, implying that every student is matched with her favorite school/college among those she qualifies for ex post. The methods are illustrated in simulations and applied to school choice in Paris. We discuss when each approach is more appropriate in real-life settings. (JEL D11, D12, D82, I23)

scholarly journals STRATEGY-PROOF JUDGMENT AGGREGATION

2007 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
FRANZ DIETRICH ◽  
CHRISTIAN LIST
Keyword(s):  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Judgment Aggregation ◽  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Is Strategy ◽  
Theoretic Concept ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Strategy Proofness

Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem. We also discuss weaker forms of non-manipulability and strategy-proofness. Comparing two frequently discussed aggregation rules, we show that “conclusion-based voting” is less vulnerable to manipulation than “premise-based voting”, which is strategy-proof only for “reason-oriented” individuals. Surprisingly, for “outcome-oriented” individuals, the two rules are strategically equivalent, generating identical judgments in equilibrium. Our results introduce game-theoretic considerations into judgment aggregation and have implications for debates on deliberative democracy.

scholarly journals Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities

2020 ◽  
pp. 2050015
Author(s):  
Ayşe Mumcu ◽  
Ismail Saglam
Keyword(s):  
Impossibility Result ◽  
Stable Matching ◽  
Matching Problem ◽  
Men And Women ◽  
Strategic Issues ◽  
Stable Mechanism ◽  
Is Strategy ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
One To One ◽  
Appl Math

We consider strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities. We show that no core (stable) mechanism is strategy-proof, extending an impossibility result of [Roth, A. E. [1982] The economics of matching: Stability and incentives, Math. Oper. Res. 7(4), 617–628] obtained in the absence of externalities. Moreover, we show that there are no limits on successful manipulation of preferences by coalitions of men and women, in contrast with the result of [Demange, G., Gale, D. and Sotomayor, M. [1987] A further note on the stable matching problem, Discrete Appl. Math. 16(3), 217–222] obtained in the absence of externalities.

scholarly journals A Theory of Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of School Quality

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yusuke Narita
Keyword(s):  
Research Design ◽  
Test Scores ◽  
School Quality ◽  
Implicit Assumption ◽  
Random Assignment ◽  
First Choice ◽  
Research Designs ◽  
Is Strategy ◽  
Quasi Experimental ◽  
Strategy Proof

Many centralized school admissions systems use lotteries to ration limited seats at oversubscribed schools. The resulting random assignment is used by empirical researchers to identify the effects of schools on outcomes like test scores. I first find that the two most popular empirical research designs may not successfully extract a random assignment of applicants to schools. When are the research designs able to overcome this problem? I show the following main results for a class of data-generating mechanisms containing those used in practice: The first-choice research design extracts a random assignment under a mechanism if the mechanism is strategy-proof for schools. In contrast, the other qualification instrument research design does not necessarily extract a random assignment under any mechanism. The former research design is therefore more compelling than the latter. Many applications of the two research designs need some implicit assumption, such as large-sample approximately random assignment, to justify their empirical strategy. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.

scholarly journals Pure Nash Equilibria in Online Fair Division

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Aleksandrov ◽  
Toby Walsh
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Specific Property ◽  
Fair Division ◽  
Pareto Efficiency ◽  
Pure Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Is Strategy ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Online Mechanism

We consider a fair division setting in which items arrive one by one and are allocated to agents via two existing mechanisms: LIKE and BALANCED LIKE. The LIKE mechanism is strategy-proof whereas the BALANCED LIKE mechanism is not. Whilst LIKE is strategy-proof, we show that it is not group strategy-proof. Indeed, our first main result is that no online mechanism is group strategy-proof. We then focus on pure Nash equilibria of these two mechanisms. Our second main result is that computing a pure Nash equilibrium is tractable for LIKE and intractable for BALANCED LIKE. Our third main result is that there could be multiple such profiles and counting them is also intractable even when we restrict our attention to equilibria with a specific property (e.g. envy-freeness, Pareto efficiency).

scholarly journals Matching with floor constraints

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 911-942
Author(s):  
Sumeyra Akin
Keyword(s):  
Additional Condition ◽  
Stable Matching ◽  
Medical Residency ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Prominent Feature ◽  
Stable Matchings ◽  
Teacher Assignment ◽  
Is Strategy ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Hard Floor

Floor constraints are a prominent feature of many matching markets, such as medical residency, teacher assignment, and military cadet matching. We develop a theory of matching markets under floor constraints. We introduce a stability notion, which we call floor respecting stability, for markets in which (hard) floor constraints must be respected. A matching is floor respecting stable if there is no coalition of doctors and hospitals that can propose an alternative matching that is feasible and an improvement for its members. Our stability notion imposes the additional condition that a coalition cannot reassign a doctor outside the coalition to another hospital (although she can be fired). This condition is necessary to guarantee the existence of stable matchings. We provide a mechanism that is strategy‐proof for doctors and implements a floor respecting stable matching.

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