Ambient Taxes When Polluters Have Multiple Choices

1998 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 186-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard D. Horan ◽  
James S. Shortle ◽  
David G. Abler
Keyword(s):  
Ambient Taxes

Experiments on Damage‐Based Ambient Taxes for Nonpoint Source Polluters

2008 ◽  
Vol 90 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordan F. Suter ◽  
Christian A. Vossler ◽  
Gregory L. Poe ◽  
Kathleen Segerson
Keyword(s):  
Nonpoint Source ◽  
Ambient Taxes

Nonpoint Source Pollution When Polluters Might Cooperate

2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Katrin Millock ◽  
François Salanié
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Nonpoint Source Pollution ◽  
Nonpoint Source ◽  
The Other ◽  
Emission Tax ◽  
Cooperative Groups ◽  
Optimal Regulation ◽  
Costly Monitoring ◽  
Ambient Tax ◽  
Ambient Taxes

AbstractIn a model of nonpoint source pollution, we extend the theory of ambient taxes to the case when polluters might cooperate. We show that regulation through ambient taxes is severely constrained when the degree of cooperation among polluters is unknown to the regulator. On the other hand, if the regulator can invest in costly monitoring of emissions, then the optimal regulation offers a low ambient tax to cooperative groups and an optimal but costly individual emission tax to non-cooperative groups. This mechanism also has attractive properties when risk-aversion is introduced.

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