Adaptive Learning and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Coordination Games: An ARCH(1) Approach

2000 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Broseta
Keyword(s):  
Adaptive Learning ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Coordination Games

The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection

2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (6) ◽  
pp. 2562-2589 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roy Chen ◽  
Yan Chen
Keyword(s):  
Social Identity ◽  
Group Identity ◽  
Social Preference ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
Preference Model ◽  
Common Group ◽  
Identity Changes ◽  
High Effort

When does a common group identity improve efficiency in coordination games? To answer this question, we propose a group-contingent social preference model and derive conditions under which social identity changes equilibrium selection. We test our predictions in the minimum-effort game in the laboratory under parameter configurations which lead to an inefficient low-effort equilibrium for subjects with no group identity. For those with a salient group identity, consistent with our theory, we find that learning leads to ingroup coordination to the efficient high-effort equilibrium. Additionally, our theoretical framework reconciles findings from a number of coordination game experiments. (JEL C71, C91, D71)

scholarly journals Coordination and Equilibrium Selection in Games: The Role of Local Effects

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomasz Raducha ◽  
Maxi San Miguel
Keyword(s):  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
System Size ◽  
Critical Value ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
Coordination Game ◽  
Local Effects ◽  
Update Rules

Abstract We study the role of local effects and finite size effects in reaching coordination and in equilibrium selection in two-player coordination games. We investigate three update rules – the replicator dynamics (RD), the best response (BR), and the unconditional imitation (UI). For the pure coordination game with two equivalent strategies we find a transition from a disordered state to coordination for a critical value of connectivity. The transition is system-size-independent for the BR and RD update rules. For the IU it is system-size-dependent, but coordination can always be reached below the connectivity of a complete graph. We also consider the general coordination game which covers a range of games, such as the stag hunt. For these games there is a payoff-dominant strategy and a risk-dominant strategy with associated states of equilibrium coordination. We analyse equilibrium selection analytically and numerically. For the RD and BR update rules mean-field predictions agree with simulations and the risk-dominant strategy is evolutionary favoured independently of local effects. When players use the unconditional imitation, however, we observe coordination in the payoff-dominant strategy. Surprisingly, the selection of pay-off dominant equilibrium only occurs below a critical value of the network connectivity and disappears in complete graphs. As we show, it is a combination of local effects and update rule that allows for coordination on the payoff-dominant strategy.

scholarly journals An Adaptive Learning Model in Coordination Games

Games ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 648-669
Author(s):  
Naoki Funai
Keyword(s):  
Adaptive Learning ◽  
Learning Model ◽  
Coordination Games
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