An Asymptotic Solution for Sealed Bid Common-Value Auctions with Bidders Having Asymmetric Information

1999 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael C Laskowski ◽  
Robert L Slonim
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Asymptotic Solution ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Common Value Auctions

scholarly journals Single object auctions with interdependent values

2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (188) ◽  
pp. 125-169
Author(s):  
Dejan Trifunovic
Keyword(s):  
Single Object ◽  
English Auction ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Reserve Prices ◽  
Interdependent Values ◽  
Common Value Auctions ◽  
Expected Revenue

This paper reviews single object auctions when bidders? values of the object are interdependent. We will see how the auction forms could be ranked in terms of expected revenue when signals that bidders have about the value of the object are affiliated. In the discussion that follows we will deal with reserve prices and entry fees. Furthermore we will examine the conditions that have to be met for English auction with asymmetric bidders to allocate the object efficiently. Finally, common value auctions will be considered when all bidders have the same value for the object.

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