Balanced Contributions Axiom in the Solution of Cooperative Games

1997 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Sánchez S.
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Balanced Contributions

scholarly journals Characterizations, Potential, and an Implementation of the Shapley-Solidarity Value

Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (11) ◽  
pp. 1965
Author(s):  
Jun Su ◽  
Yuan Liang ◽  
Guangmin Wang ◽  
Genjiu Xu
Keyword(s):  
Potential Function ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Coalition Structure ◽  
Balanced Contributions ◽  
Bidding Mechanism

In this paper, we provide cooperative and non-cooperative interpretations of the Shapley–Solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure. Firstly, we present two new characterizations of this value based on intracoalitional quasi-balanced contributions property. Secondly, we study a potential function of the Shapley–Solidarity value. Finally, we propose a new bidding mechanism for the Solidarity value and then apply the result to the Shapley–Solidarity value.

Share-out in Cooperative Games under Uncertainty

1999 ◽  
Vol 31 (11) ◽  
pp. 10-14
Author(s):  
Vladislav I. Zhukovskiy ◽  
E. N. Opletayeva
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Games

A stochastic approach to approximate values in cooperative games

2019 ◽  
Vol 279 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Benati ◽  
Fernando López-Blázquez ◽  
Justo Puerto
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Stochastic Approach

scholarly journals Weak Berge Equilibrium in Finite Three-person Games: Conception and Computation

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-134
Author(s):  
Konstantin Kudryavtsev ◽  
Ustav Malkov
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Hippocratic Oath ◽  
The Other ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Finite Games ◽  
Moral Basis ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Berge Equilibrium ◽  
Do No Harm ◽  
Non Cooperative Games

AbstractThe paper proposes the concept of a weak Berge equilibrium. Unlike the Berge equilibrium, the moral basis of this equilibrium is the Hippocratic Oath “First do no harm”. On the other hand, any Berge equilibrium is a weak Berge equilibrium. But, there are weak Berge equilibria, which are not the Berge equilibria. The properties of the weak Berge equilibrium have been investigated. The existence of the weak Berge equilibrium in mixed strategies has been established for finite games. The weak Berge equilibria for finite three-person non-cooperative games are computed.

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