Dynamic Consistency and Imperfect Recall

1997 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierpaolo Battigalli
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Consistency ◽  
Imperfect Recall

scholarly journals Dynamic consistency, valuable information and subjective beliefs

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Spyros Galanis
Keyword(s):  
Value Of Information ◽  
Single Agent ◽  
Bayesian Updating ◽  
Dynamic Consistency ◽  
Decision Problems ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Subjective Expected Utility ◽  
Trading Behavior ◽  
Subjective Beliefs ◽  
Convex Preferences

AbstractAmbiguity sensitive preferences must fail either Consequentialism or Dynamic Consistency (DC), two properties that are compatible with subjective expected utility and Bayesian updating, while forming the basis of backward induction and dynamic programming. We examine the connection between these properties in a general environment of convex preferences over monetary acts and find that, far from being incompatible, they are connected in an economically meaningful way. In single-agent decision problems, positive value of information characterises one direction of DC. We propose a weakening of DC and show that one direction is equivalent to weakly valuable information, whereas the other characterises the Bayesian updating of the subjective beliefs which are revealed by trading behavior.

scholarly journals Automated construction of bounded-loss imperfect-recall abstractions in extensive-form games

2020 ◽  
Vol 282 ◽  
pp. 103248
Author(s):  
Jiří Čermák ◽  
Viliam Lisý ◽  
Branislav Bošanský
Keyword(s):  
Extensive Form ◽  
Extensive Form Games ◽  
Imperfect Recall
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