AUDITORS’ RECOGNITION AND DISCLOSURE MATERIALITY THRESHOLDS: THEIR MAGNITUDE AND THE EFFECTS OF INDUSTRY

2000 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERROL R. ISELIN ◽  
TAKIAH M. ISKANDAR
Keyword(s):  
Materiality Thresholds

The Effect of Misstatements on Decisions of Financial Statement Users: An Experimental Investigation of Auditor Materiality Thresholds

2002 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brad Tuttle ◽  
Maribeth Coller ◽  
R. David Plumlee
Keyword(s):  
Economic Condition ◽  
Accounting Information ◽  
Critical Factor ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Asset Markets ◽  
Market Prices ◽  
Financial Misstatements ◽  
Experimental Asset Markets ◽  
Financial Misstatement ◽  
Materiality Thresholds

Auditors are faced with the dilemma of inferring materiality based, in part, on whether a given level of financial misstatement will affect the decisions of statement users. Misstatements in accounting information that are below the materiality threshold are not expected to change users' assessments of a company's economic condition. While the auditing profession accepts materiality in concept, its application in practice is more controversial. In certain settings, the nature of a misstatement, such as changing a small profit into a loss, may affect an auditor's materiality judgment. However, in many cases the magnitude of the misstatement is a critical factor in judging materiality. We focus solely on the issue of magnitude and examine whether financial misstatements that are at or below commonly applied materiality thresholds result in market prices that differ from those resulting from correctly stated information. We conduct a series of 12 experimental asset markets each consisting of 12 independent three-minute trading periods with six traders in each market. We then compare prices for companies generated by markets that are provided either correctly stated information, information containing misstatements that would typically be considered immaterial, or information containing material misstatements. Results indicate that undisclosed misstatements within materiality thresholds that are consistent with current audit practice do not affect market prices, while misstatements well above these thresholds do.

Materiality Thresholds Defined by Courts: The UK Evidence

1994 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 234-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Gin Chong ◽  
Gerald Vinten
Keyword(s):  
Materiality Thresholds ◽  
The Uk

The Role of Audit Firm Expertise and Knowledge Spillover in Mitigating Earnings Management through the Tax Accounts

2014 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brant E. Christensen ◽  
Adam J. Olson ◽  
Thomas C. Omer
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Knowledge Spillover ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Management Tool ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Reporting Process ◽  
Materiality Thresholds ◽  
National Industry

ABSTRACT Tax-related accounts are complex and often the last accounts finalized in the financial reporting process. Accordingly, these accounts can be used as a “last-chance” earnings management tool (Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills 2004). We investigate the extent to which an audit firm's industry expertise constrains earnings management through the tax accounts. We find that national industry audit experts constrain earnings management through the tax accounts. We also find that audit firm tax expertise constrains earnings management through the tax accounts when the audit firm is not considered an industry audit expert. Finally, we find evidence that providing both audit and tax services facilitates a nonexpert firm's ability to constrain earnings management through the tax accounts, which suggests that knowledge spillover plays an important role in reducing “last-chance” earnings management. All findings hold among smaller clients and when the extent of earnings management is below quantitative materiality thresholds. Data Availability: All data are publicly available as noted in the text.

Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 108 Disclosures: Descriptive Evidence from the Revelation of Accounting Misstatements

2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marsha B. Keune ◽  
Karla M. Johnstone
Keyword(s):  
Real Estate ◽  
Descriptive Analysis ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Revenue Recognition ◽  
Deferred Taxes ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Materiality Thresholds

SYNOPSIS: The purpose of this paper is to provide a descriptive analysis of companies’ previously uncorrected financial statement misstatements using disclosures recently mandated by Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 108 (SAB No. 108). We analyze 355 companies that disclose and correct 792 misstatements in their financial statements filed from November 15, 2006, to February 15, 2008. We present descriptive evidence on the size and industry distribution of companies who disclose SAB No. 108 adjustments, showing that larger companies and those in the banking/insurance/real estate industries are most commonly represented in our sample. We also describe the types of audit firms that are associated with these companies. The results show that the concentration of sample companies in the banking/insurance/real estate industries are most often audited by the smallest audit firms in the market, and there is considerable variation in the application of quantitative materiality thresholds for SAB No. 108 disclosures across audit firms. Finally, our descriptive analyses reveal insights about the nature, direction, and magnitude of specific misstatements corrected by SAB No. 108. For example, we show that the most common SAB No. 108 misstatement corrections involve current liabilities, deferred taxes, revenue recognition, and leases. In addition, many companies in our sample used SAB No. 108 to correct misstatements identified in the current year to avoid restating prior period financial statements.

The Joint Influence of the Extent and Nature of Audit Evidence, Materiality Thresholds, and Misstatement Type on Achieved Audit Risk

2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 19-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
David V. Budescu ◽  
Mark E. Peecher ◽  
Ira Solomon
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Joint Influence ◽  
Materiality Thresholds ◽  
External Auditor ◽  
Audit Effectiveness

SUMMARY We use simulation to investigate the joint effects of materiality, evidence extent, evidence nature, and misstatement type on achieved audit risk, i.e., the risk of undetected material financial statement misstatement due to error or fraud. Our primary results are fourfold. First, contrary to conventional audit wisdom, we show that elevating the extent of testing decreases achieved audit risk only under certain conditions and may well increase it. Second, reducing materiality (attempting to perform a more precise audit) can either enhance or jeopardize audit effectiveness. Third, learning about the quality of the internal controls over financial reporting not only can help the auditor to perform an integrated audit, but also helps the auditor to reach better judgments about the extent to which and how evidence from the auditee organization's management and/or information systems may be distorted as a result of misstatement, reducing the risk that the auditor would be misled by such evidence. Fourth, when financial statements are biased intentionally due to fraud, it is especially important for the external auditor to supplement more traditional audit tests with tests that produce evidence that is less likely to be biased by management. Auditors who do not understand these four results run a heightened risk of compromising audit effectiveness.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document