Binary rewriting and call interception for efficient runtime protection against buffer overflows

2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (9) ◽  
pp. 971-998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kumar Avijit ◽  
Prateek Gupta ◽  
Deepak Gupta
Keyword(s):  
Binary Rewriting ◽  
Buffer Overflows

scholarly journals Transient and Stationary Losses in a Finite-Buffer Queue with Batch Arrivals

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrzej Chydzinski ◽  
Blazej Adamczyk
Keyword(s):  
Batch Size ◽  
Buffer Size ◽  
Arrival Process ◽  
Time Interval ◽  
Finite Buffer ◽  
Finite Time Interval ◽  
Batch Arrivals ◽  
Batch Markovian Arrival Process ◽  
Buffer Overflows ◽  
Finite Buffer Queue

We present an analysis of the number of losses, caused by the buffer overflows, in a finite-buffer queue with batch arrivals and autocorrelated interarrival times. Using the batch Markovian arrival process, the formulas for the average number of losses in a finite time interval and the stationary loss ratio are shown. In addition, several numerical examples are presented, including illustrations of the dependence of the number of losses on the average batch size, buffer size, system load, autocorrelation structure, and time.

Taint Graph of System Call Arguments for Intrusion Detection in Mobile Intelatrac

2012 ◽  
Vol 546-547 ◽  
pp. 1101-1106
Author(s):  
Dan Nie ◽  
Yu Hui Wang
Keyword(s):  
Intrusion Detection ◽  
Control Flow ◽  
System Call ◽  
Mobile Telecommunication ◽  
Control Data ◽  
Critical Data ◽  
Buffer Overflows ◽  
System Calls ◽  
Flow Information ◽  
Behavior Profile

The intended data-flow in a vulnerable program is subject to be subverted by attacks which exploit buffer overflows or format string vulnerabilities to write data to unintended location. In Mobile Telecommunication it is especially important on data safety. These attacks can be classified into two types: control-flow-attacks exploit buffer overflows or other vulnerabilities to overwrite a return address, a function pointer, or some other piece of control-data; non-control-data attacks exploit similar vulnerabilities to overwrite security critical data without subverting the intended control-flow in the program. The control-flow attacks are well studied and widely used, so there are several typical approaches to prevent them, which monitor the sequence of system calls emitted by the application being monitored and utilize control-flow information of the system calls for intrusion detection. However, the non-control-data attacks are rare for the reason that they rely on specific semantics of the target applications, and there are only few works that defend them to some extent. In order to prevent non-control-data attacks, we leverage dynamic taint technique to track the instruction level relationship between different system call arguments and construct taint graph which can represent behavior profile of a benign program in this paper..

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