scholarly journals Profit‐enhancing entries in mixed oligopolies

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junichi Haraguchi ◽  
Toshihiro Matsumura
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Oligopolies

International Tariffs in a Mixed Oligopoly with Research Spillovers

2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-293
Author(s):  
Shoji Haruna ◽  
Rajeev K. Goel
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Organization ◽  
Research And Development ◽  
Technical Change ◽  
Large Range ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Mixed Oligopoly ◽  
Private Firms ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Public Firm ◽  
Mixed Oligopolies

AbstractThis paper merges three strands of the literature – industrial organization, international trade, and economics of technical change – to examine the effect of tariffs on international mixed oligopolies which conduct research and development (R&D) that is prone to spillovers. Mixed oligopolies are prevalent in the defense sector, among other sectors. Using a two-stage sequential game with R&D in the first stage and production in the second stage, results show that higher tariffs reduce outputs of both the domestic public firm and foreign private firms, and private R&D. Effects on domestic R&D and welfare, and profits of foreign private firms depend upon spillovers. Within a large range of research spillovers, higher tariffs can in fact lower welfare. Some of these findings are different from traditional oligopolies and from models that ignore research spillovers. Policy implications are discussed.

Collusion in mixed oligopolies and the coordinated effects of privatization

2017 ◽  
Vol 124 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
João Correia-da-Silva ◽  
Joana Pinho
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Oligopolies ◽  
Coordinated Effects

Optimal Privatisation Policy under Private Leadership in Mixed Oligopolies

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Ming Hsin Lin ◽  
Toshihiro Matsumura
Keyword(s):  
Marginal Cost ◽  
Private Firms ◽  
Cost Difference ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Optimal Degree ◽  
Public Firm ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Mixed Oligopolies ◽  
Simultaneous Move

We discuss optimal privatisation policies in mixed oligopolies in which a public firm is the Stackelberg follower (private leadership). We find that under constant marginal cost, the optimal degree of privatisation is zero. When the marginal cost is increasing, however, the optimal degree is never zero, and full privatisation can be optimal. These results suggest that the optimal privatisation policy depends on the cost conditions. We also find that the optimal degree of privatisation is substantially lower under private leadership than in the simultaneous-move model when there is no cost difference between public and private firms.

Privatization Neutrality Theorem in Free Entry Markets

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Toshihiro Matsumura ◽  
Yasunori Okumura
Keyword(s):  
Time Structure ◽  
Free Entry ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Optimal Output ◽  
Policy Tool ◽  
Entry Models ◽  
Time Structures ◽  
Mixed Oligopolies

AbstractIt is known that if the number of entering firms is endogenous (free entry markets), privatization is not necessarily welfare neutral in mixed oligopolies under a uniform production subsidy policy. We revisit this problem by considering another policy tool, the output floor regulation. We investigate three free entry models with different time structures, a Cournot and two Stackelberg models. We find that neutrality is restored in free entry markets under the optimal output floor regulation, regardless of the time structure.

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