Contribution Limits and Transparency in a Campaign Finance Experiment

Dmitry Shapiro; Arthur Zillante

doi:10.1002/soej.12220

Pareto-Improving Campaign Finance Policy

The American Economic Review ◽

10.1257/0002828041464443 ◽

2004 ◽

Vol 94 (3) ◽

pp. 628-655 ◽

Cited By ~ 120

Author(s):

Stephen Coate

Keyword(s):

Interest Groups ◽

Campaign Finance ◽

Campaign Contributions ◽

Public Financing ◽

Finance Policy ◽

Pareto Improving ◽

Campaign Advertising ◽

Contribution Limits

This paper argues that campaign finance policy, in the form of contribution limits and matching public financing, can be Pareto improving even under very optimistic assumptions concerning the role of campaign advertising and the rationality of voters. The optimistic assumptions are that candidates use campaign contributions to convey truthful information to voters about their qualifications for office and that voters update their beliefs rationally on the basis of the information they have seen.The argument also assumes that campaign contributions are provided by interest groups and that candidates can offer to provide policy favors to attract higher contributions.

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Detecting and Understanding Donor Strategies in Midterm Elections

Political Research Quarterly ◽

10.1177/1065912917749323 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 71 (3) ◽

pp. 503-516 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Jesse H. Rhodes ◽

Brian F. Schaffner ◽

Raymond J. La Raja

Keyword(s):

Campaign Finance ◽

Midterm Elections ◽

Individual Decisions ◽

Fresh Insight ◽

Divergent Contribution ◽

Insight Into ◽

Contribution Limits

What explains how political donors decide where to give? Existing research indicates that people donate money to express support for a preferred political “team” and enjoy the emotional benefits of participating in politics. While this explains why people donate, it does little to help understand the different strategies that donors may pursue. In this paper, we use data on individual decisions as to where to allocate contributions to provide fresh insight into the strategies donors are pursuing. Our approach yields a much more nuanced view of campaign finance by showing how differently situated donors pursue divergent contribution strategies. Of particular note, we identify an influential class of engaged and wealthy political donors that spreads their dollars widely, especially focusing on giving to out-of-jurisdiction candidates. This illustrates just how influential the recent elimination of aggregate contribution limits may be in allowing a small share of donors to be broadly influential.

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How Much To Ask? Platforms, Parties, and Suggested Amounts in Political Fundraising

10.33774/apsa-2021-sk5xb ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Seo-young Silvia Kim

Keyword(s):

Political Parties ◽

Campaign Finance ◽

State Level ◽

Political Campaigns ◽

Demand Side ◽

Top Down ◽

Average Income ◽

Using Data ◽

Party State ◽

Contribution Limits

How much do political campaigns ask for contributions, and how do they vary by electoral characteristics and fundraising environments? When soliciting donations, campaigns typically present a set of suggested amounts to procure more money from potential donors. However, we know almost nothing about how campaigns make these demand-side choices. This paper builds benchmark observations and analyzes how political parties and fundraising platforms shape these decisions, using data collected from U.S. federal candidates and fundraising platforms in 2020. Candidates' average suggested amounts differ by party, state-level average income, and fundraising platforms. Ideologically extreme candidates did not solicit smaller dollars, and if anything, the opposite was documented. In addition, the representative digital fundraising platforms by party---ActBlue for Democrats, WinRed for Republicans---could influence campaign tactics such as effective, top-down adjustment for increased contribution limits. I conclude that platforms can be important, active players in the campaign finance ecosystem.

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