Political hazards, experience, and sequential entry strategies: the international expansion of Japanese firms, 1980-1998

The best opportunity for growth is often overseas, even for smaller entrepreneurial firms. However, resource constrained smaller firms do not have as many available entry strategies as do larger Multinational Corporations (MNCs). Smaller firms frequently must ally themselves with partners in order to make international expansion feasible. The alliance of two distinct parties central to these entry strategies lends itself to an Agency Theory (AT) perspective. AT illuminates the underpinnings of these relationships; in particular, highlighting problems and risks that the respective parties face when entering into the partnership. The paper develops these problems within the entrepreneur/export agent realm and suggests contractual methods for overcoming these problems.

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The Timing of International Expansion: Information, Rivalry and Imitation Among Japanese Firms, 1980–2002

Journal of Management Studies ◽

10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00742.x ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 0 (0) ◽

pp. 071115153913001-??? ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Andrew Delios ◽

Ajai S. Gaur ◽

Shige Makino

Keyword(s):

International Expansion ◽

Japanese Firms

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Entrepreneurial Entry into Foreign Markets: A Transaction Cost Perspective

Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice ◽

10.1177/104225879702100302 ◽

1997 ◽

Vol 21 (3) ◽

pp. 23-40 ◽

Cited By ~ 87

Author(s):

Andrew L. Zacharakis

Keyword(s):

Adverse Selection ◽

Multinational Enterprises ◽

Strategic Alliance ◽

Joint Venture ◽

Entrepreneurial Firms ◽

International Expansion ◽

Foreign Markets ◽

Entrepreneurial Entry ◽

Entry Strategies ◽

Transaction Costs Economics

The best opportunity for growth is often overseas, even for smaller entrepreneurial firms. However, resource-constrained smaller firms do not have as many available entry strategies as do larger multinational enterprises (MNEs). Smaller firms frequently must ally themselves with partners in order to make international expansion feasible (e.g. employing an export agent, licensing, joint venture, or strategic alliance strategy). The alliance of two distinct parties central to these entry strategies lends itself to a transaction costs economics (TCE) perspective. TCE illuminates the underpinnings of these relationships, in particular, highlighting problems and risks that the respective parties face when entering into the partnership. These problems arise from the threat of opportunism, specifically, adverse selection and moral hazard. The paper develops these problems within the entrepreneur/export agent realm and suggests methods for overcoming these problems.

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