scholarly journals Managerial compensation and corporate spinoffs

2016 ◽  
Vol 37 (10) ◽  
pp. 2011-2030 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emilie R. Feldman
Keyword(s):  
Managerial Compensation ◽  
Corporate Spinoffs

scholarly journals Managerial compensation and firm performance: Evidence from corporate spinoffs

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 69-78
Author(s):  
Qian Li ◽  
Ebru Reis
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Performance Improvement ◽  
Operating Performance ◽  
Managerial Incentives ◽  
Managerial Compensation ◽  
Incentive Structure ◽  
Managerial Incentive ◽  
Agency Relationship ◽  
Corporate Spinoffs ◽  
Unique Dataset

In this paper, we study changes in the incentive structure of the CEOs in both parent and spun-off companies, and the effect of managerial incentives on operating performance due to an improved agency relationship between shareholders and managers of both firms after the spinoff. We construct a unique dataset that covers corporate spinoffs between 1992 and 2004. We find a certain level of increase in pay-performance sensitivity of the CEOs of spun-off firms as compared to the CEOs of parent firms. We find that pay-performance sensitivities of both parent and spun-off firms’ CEOs are positively related to the operating performance improvement after the spinoff. Overall, our study provides evidence that improved managerial incentive is a source of gains in spinoffs.

Prediction of managerial compensation

1971 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan G. Weinstein ◽  
V. Srinivasan
Keyword(s):  
Managerial Compensation

Taxes as a Determinant of Managerial Compensation in Privately Held Insurance Companies

2001 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 655-674 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bin Ke
Keyword(s):  
Control Sample ◽  
Tax Planning ◽  
Managerial Compensation ◽  
Insurance Companies ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Investment Income ◽  
Federal Income Tax ◽  
Planning Decision ◽  
Privately Held Firms ◽  
Privately Held

This study empirically investigates how taxes affect managerial compensation for a sample of privately held insurers whose managers own a large percentage of the firm's stock (I refer to these as management-owned insurers) during 1989–1996. Shareholder/managers receive two types of income from the firm they own: compensation income as employees, and investment income as shareholders. Although compensation income is taxable to employees and deductible by employers, investment income is subject to double taxation. Thus, the mix of the two is an important tax-planning decision for management-owned insurers. I predict and find that as individual tax rates increased relative to corporate tax rates from 1989–1992 to 1993–1996, shareholder/managers paid themselves less tax-deductible compensation relative to a control sample of nonmanagement-owned insurers (i.e., privately held insurers with no managerial ownership). The study's results expand our understanding of management-owned, privately held firms' tax-planning strategies, and have implications for the efficiency of the federal income tax system.

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