A lattice-based partially blind signature

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 1820-1828 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haibo Tian ◽  
Fangguo Zhang ◽  
Baodian Wei
2013 ◽  
Vol 32 (5) ◽  
pp. 1388-1391
Author(s):  
Jun-jie HE ◽  
Juan WANG ◽  
Chuan-da QI

2011 ◽  
Vol 282-283 ◽  
pp. 449-452
Author(s):  
Xin De Wang ◽  
Jing Liang Zhang ◽  
Zheng Tao Jiang

A new partially blind signature scheme is proposed based on Schnorr blind signature scheme. Compared with the previous schemes, the proposed scheme has lower computations and shorter signature size. By conversely using the proposed partially blind signature, a fair e-payment protocol is given. An advantage of this protocol is that two participants achieve the goals of exchanging their items without intervention of a third party. The low computations and good properties of the underlying partially blind signature guarantee that the proposed protocol has needed efficiency and security.


2011 ◽  
Vol 282-283 ◽  
pp. 307-311
Author(s):  
Li Zhen Ma

Any one who knows the signer’s public key can verify the validity of a given signature in partially blind signature schemes. This verifying universality may be used by cheats if the signed message is sensitive or personal. To solve this problem, a new convertible user designating confirmer partially blind signature, in which only the designated confirmer (designated by the user) and the user can verify and confirm the validity of given signatures and convert given signatures into publicly verifiable ones, is proposed. Compared with Huang et al.’s scheme, the signature size is shortened about 25% and the computation quantity is reduced about 36% in the proposed scheme. Under random oracle model and intractability of Discrete Logarithm Problem the proposed scheme is provably secure.


2014 ◽  
Vol 519-520 ◽  
pp. 462-465
Author(s):  
Lin Cheng ◽  
Qiao Yan Wen ◽  
Dong Bo

Partially blind signature is an important technique in secure electronic cash system. Recently, Zhang et al. presented the first certificateless partially blind signature scheme and constructed an electronic cash system based on this scheme. They claimed that their certificateless partially blind signature scheme is secure in the random oracle model. However, in this paper, we demonstrate the scheme is not secure. Our attack indicates that a malicious KGC in the electronic cash system based on Zhang et al.'s certificateless partially blind signature can forge valid electronic coins without being detected by the bank. It will result in loss of the bank.


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