Bureaucratic Accountability and Disaster Response: Why Did the Korea Coast Guard Fail in Its Rescue Mission During the Sewol
 Ferry Accident?

The last days of August 2012 brought Hurricane Isaac's wind and water energy to south Louisiana impacting many parishes with destruction of property and leaving behind severe flooding, making response difficult in some locations. After search and rescue efforts ensuring safety of the people in the areas had been completed, surveys by boat and aircraft began to reveal impacts to wildlife from petroleum product of unknown origin. As in past natural disaster response activations, wildlife professionals expected oil impacted animal cases to remain minimal; however, there was confirmation from some response crews on site that there were in fact affected animals. Given that there was no named Responsible Parties, the United States Coast Guard (USCG), as the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC), took the lead in activation of the Oil Spill Response Organizations (OSROs) and the wildlife personnel to conduct recovery and rehabilitation efforts in coordination with the State of Louisiana. All costs associated with these activities were covered by the National Pollution Funds Center (NPFC), which is managed by the USCG as promulgated under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). Wildlife Response Services, Inc. (WRS) supported by Matrix New World Engineering, Inc. (Matrix), was mobilized on September 2, 2012 to set up a Wildlife Rehabilitation Center (Center) in Belle Chase, Louisiana. The Center was set up in the Bricor Trucking Warehouse and the team had the Center operational the morning of September 3, 2013and received its first animal in the afternoon of that same day. During the response the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) was responsible for oiled wildlife recovery and transport to the Center. Over the course of the response 7 live animals were cared for, most of which were cleaned and eventually released back into the wild. The Hurricane Isaac response demonstrated the leadership of the USCG in organizing oiled wildlife recovery and rehabilitation jointly with LDWF and WRS, as well as with the OSROs. This is a model for responses to future natural disasters.

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THE KATRINA OIL SPILL RESPONSE: THE ROAD TO RECOVERY AND POST-DISASTER UPDATES

International Oil Spill Conference Proceedings ◽

10.7901/2169-3358-2008-1-1225 ◽

2008 ◽

Vol 2008 (1) ◽

pp. 1225-1229 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Kim Keel ◽

Stacey Crecy ◽

Charlie Henry

Keyword(s):

Crude Oil ◽

Hurricane Katrina ◽

Disaster Response ◽

Oil Spills ◽

Initial Response ◽

Coast Guard ◽

Storm Events ◽

Storage Tanks ◽

Prevention Measures ◽

Oil Storage

ABSTRACT In addition to the loss of life and property caused by Hurricane Katrina, the powerful storm caused significant environmental injury. The destruction and failure of hundreds of oil facilities and oil storage tanks resulted in many oil spills. Coast Guard Sector New Orleans received reports that more than 8 million gallons of crude oil were discharged throughout the region. The largest single incident resulted in the loss of an estimated 90,000 bbls of crude oil from two large storage tanks in a very remote location near Cox Bay, Louisiana. Other authors will describe how the initial response managers overcame the incredible challenges of managing multiple oil spills in an enormous area devoid of support infrastructure, human resources and the logistical networks normally present. By January 2006, most of the oil spills from facilities impacted by Hurricane Katrina had entered the natural recovery phase while the response had transitioned from the initial disaster response phase to a more traditional response. However, in February 2008, there are still several sites that require continued clean-up and monitoring by federal and state officials. This paper will review the final stages of the federal government'S response to the Katrina-related oil spills and include planning and prevention measures that could reduce the risk of oil spills during similar storm events. Some of the topics included are: Hurricane Planning in Southeastern Louisiana'S Coastal Zone and consideration for improving facility Hurricane and Contingency Plans.

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NOAA Scientific Support for a Natural Gas Pipeline Release During Hurricane Harvey Flooding in the Neches River Beaumont, Texas

International Oil Spill Conference Proceedings ◽

10.7901/2169-3358-2021.1.687018 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 2021 (1) ◽

Author(s):

Adam Davis ◽

Dalina Thrift-Viveros ◽

Commander Matt S. Baker

Keyword(s):

Natural Gas ◽

Disaster Response ◽

Technical Assistance ◽

Coast Guard ◽

Gas Pipeline ◽

Scientific Support ◽

Natural Gas Pipeline ◽

Extreme Flood ◽

Neches River ◽

The U.S

ABSTRACT During the height of historic flooding from Hurricane Harvey's rainfall, a rupture occurred in a 16-inch, 80 psia (65 psig) natural gas pipeline crossing the Neches River east of Beaumont, Texas. Over the preceding five days, Hurricane Harvey stalled over the area, generating rainfall totals between 35 and 60 inches. The storm broke the record for rainfall totals in the U.S., with 60.58 inches reported in Nederland, Texas and 60.54 inches near Groves, Texas. The Neches River was in extreme flood conditions, cresting the day after the pipeline rupture at a historic high of 19.59 feet (nearly 10 feet above major flood stage and nearly 7 feet above the former historic record from 1994). At the request of the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Unit (MSU) Port Arthur, NOAA's Emergency Response Division provided scientific support for the incident including on-scene support from the NOAA Scientific Support Coordinator (pre-deployed in Port Arthur, Texas for disaster response) as well as technical assistance from the NOAA Scientific Support Team in Seattle and Baton Rouge. Products and support provided by NOAA included air hazard modeling using ALOHA (Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres) as well as the overall hazards assessment. ALOHA modeling indicated that several significant ignition sources were located within the specific threat zone identified. However, no ignition occurred and no injury or further damage resulted from the release. This incident highlights the advantages and limitations of using ALOHA to model a subsurface natural gas release from a large underwater pipeline provided in the context of an ongoing response to historic flooding and high intensity search and rescue and emergency port operations resulting from a natural disaster.

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“Sell first, repent later.”

10.7591/cornell/9781501759123.003.0011 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 178-190

Author(s):

Jessica DuLong

Keyword(s):

Disaster Response ◽

Coast Guard ◽

Lower Manhattan ◽

Private Citizens ◽

Trade Center ◽

Second Wave ◽

New Yorkers ◽

Outbound Containers ◽

Center Site ◽

Corporate Contributions

This chapter examines how Chelsea Piers facilities, located directly up the Westside Highway from Lower Manhattan, had served a major role in disaster response from the earliest hours of the 9/11 attacks. The piers offered water stations for people fleeing from downtown and became a key debarkation point for the waterborne evacuation, delivering more than 10,000 people off the island from its docks. Then, the following day, more than 30,000 people arrived to volunteer their help and connect with other New Yorkers. In the days that followed, thousands of uniformed personnel were fed in an events center at Pier 60, hundreds of rescuers slept and showered in Chelsea Piers facilities, and truckloads of donations and supplies were assembled and processed for delivery to the trade center site. By Wednesday, the flood of private citizens' donations had been supplemented with massive corporate contributions arriving in bulk. Meanwhile, the Coast Guard was confronted with two opposing missions: protecting potential targets of a second-wave attack and continuing commerce in a port that regularly handled approximately 6,000 inbound and outbound containers daily, the closure of which created complications worldwide.

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POLLUTION RESPONSE IN POST DISASTER RECOVERY- BEST PRACTICES FROM HURRICANE SANDY

International Oil Spill Conference Proceedings ◽

10.7901/2169-3358-2014.1.1041 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 2014 (1) ◽

pp. 1041-1049

Author(s):

LT Christopher M. Kimrey ◽

CDR Eric J. Doucette

Keyword(s):

New York ◽

Disaster Response ◽

Best Practice ◽

Geographic Area ◽

Hurricane Sandy ◽

Coast Guard ◽

Operational Planning ◽

Environmental Response ◽

Joint Agency ◽

Post Disaster

ABSTRACT Operational Planning is the controlled process of quickly transitioning from chaos to calm; the ability to quell the unknown and create an environment of known, manageable hazards. The most notable challenge during all-hazards operations is moving emergency response operations forward in a concerted effort in somewhat nebulous and demanding environments, yet in accordance with all-hazards frameworks, laws and standing agency policies. Hurricane Sandy post-disaster response operations provided just the right test for that capability- an austere environment, an expansive geographic area, joint agency operations and latent hazards. Nevertheless, Hurricane Sandy post-disaster response operations, particularly those supporting Emergency Support Function 10 (ESF-10), proved infinitely successful, largely due to the deliberate operational planning and data processing methodologies developed to establish the clearest possible operational picture. Developed protocols, established later as a best practice, combined federal policies and regulations on pollution response operations and disaster response into a single operating standard for ESF-10 pollution response activities in support of Coast Guard Sector New York Unified Command operations in New York and New Jersey. Environmental response operations encompassed eight geographic Divisions and included thousands of potential pollution sources. This paper highlights specific methodologies for analyzing and prioritizing threats post-response, coordinating efforts across a joint-agency landscape and mounting an expeditious and efficient environmental response campaign in a concerted, unified manner.

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