Public corruption and the allocation of government contracts

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zuobao Wei ◽  
Yicheng Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Government Contracts ◽  
Public Corruption

Why do the national financial and monetary policies not boost the economy?

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (7) ◽  
pp. 1496-1521
Author(s):  
N.I. Kulikov ◽  
M.A. Kulikova ◽  
A.A.S.R. Mobio
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Policy Support ◽  
Gdp Growth ◽  
Government Contracts ◽  
Monetary Policies ◽  
The Past ◽  
Russian Economy ◽  
Yearly Average ◽  
Analysis And Synthesis ◽  
The Government

Subject. This article assesses the reasons why the economic policy of the Government and Central Bank of Russia does not cause the economic advance. The article tries to find out why the two strategic programmes adopted over the past ten years have not been implemented in most indicators. Objectives. The article aims to analyze the results of financial and monetary policies in Russia over the past ten years, and establish why the Russian economy has been growing within one percent yearly average all these years, and its share in the world economy has not grown, but got reduced even. Methods. For the study, we used the methods of analysis and synthesis. Results. The article proposes certain measures and activities to move to soft financial and monetary policies of the State and corresponding changes in the structure of the Russian economy. This will help ensure six to seven percent GDP growth annually. Conclusions. High loan rates have become the main obstacle to GDP growth in Russia. It is necessary to accept concrete actions and decisions concerning the Bank of Russia key rate, expansion of the functions of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, industrial policy, support of consumer demand, long-term government contracts for the real sector enterprises, etc.

The Relation between Cost Shifting and Segment Profitability in the Defense-Contracting Industry

2002 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 949-969 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annie S. McGowan ◽  
Valaria P. Vendrzyk
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Government Contracts ◽  
Cost Shifting ◽  
Defense Contractors ◽  
Defense Contracting ◽  
Government Work ◽  
Defense Contracts

We test the conjecture from prior research that defense contractors' excess profitability in the 1980s stemmed from their ability to shift common overhead costs to government contracts that typically allow cost reimbursement or price renegotiation (Rogerson 1992; Thomas and Tung 1992; Lichtenberg 1992). Although we confirm prior evidence that defense contractors enjoyed abnormally high profitability on their government work in the 1984–1989 period (a period of relatively low competition for defense contracts), we find no evidence that this excess profitability is attributable to cost shifting. In addition, we find no evidence that the Top 100 defense contractors (firms that likely wield above-average market power) are able to use cost shifting to exploit a lack of competition in the industry. Our results suggest that, contrary to the conjectures in prior research, the unusually high profitability reported on government contracts in 1984–1989 is more likely attributable to nonaccounting explanations than to cost shifting.

Predicting Public Corruption with Neural Networks: An Analysis of Spanish Provinces

2017 ◽  
Vol 140 (3) ◽  
pp. 975-998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Félix J. López-Iturriaga ◽  
Iván Pastor Sanz
Keyword(s):  
Neural Networks ◽  
Public Corruption

scholarly journals NGOs and Civil Society: The Politics of Crafting a Civic Welfare Infrastructure in the Hu–Wen Period

2018 ◽  
Vol 237 ◽  
pp. 58-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jude Howell
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Policy Process ◽  
Government Contracts ◽  
Welfare Provision ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Institutional Politics ◽  
Regulatory Changes ◽  
Poverty And Inequality ◽  
State Actor ◽  
Service Oriented

AbstractSince 2015 rights-based NGOs, lawyers, feminists and journalists have endured the most stringent crackdown since 1989. Simultaneously the Xi Li administration has pushed forward a series of laws, policies and regulatory changes to enable service-oriented NGOs to apply for government contracts to provide welfare services. This seemingly Janus-like policy of welfarist incorporation can be traced back to the Hu–Wen period, often described as a lacklustre period, despite significant efforts to tackle issues of poverty and inequality. This article argues for a more balanced appraisal of this period by exploring in depth the complex politics underpinning efforts to pluralize welfare provision by involving service-oriented NGOs. It explores three sets of politics influencing this policy process: inter-institutional politics; state/non-state actor politics; and domestic/external politics. Furthermore, it considers processes of gradual institutional change adopted by key political actors to achieve these ends.

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