The Polythink Syndrome: U.S. Foreign Policy Decisions on 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and ISIS by AlexMintz and CarlyWayne. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2016. 200 pp. Cloth, $70.00; paper, $22.95.

2017 ◽  
Vol 132 (1) ◽  
pp. 186-187
Author(s):  
David Patrick Houghton
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Stanford University ◽  
Policy Decisions

Capitalising upon Globalisation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Webber
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
International Development ◽  
Macroeconomic Policy ◽  
Domestic Policy ◽  
Policy Decisions ◽  
Gordon Brown ◽  
Development Policies ◽  
At Home

Having mapped out in the previous chapter, New Labour’s often contradictory and even ‘politically-convenient’ understanding of globalisation, chapter 3 offers analysis of three key areas of domestic policy that Gordon Brown would later transpose to the realm of international development: (i) macroeconomic policy, (ii) business, and (iii) welfare. Since, according to Brown at least, globalisation had resulted in a blurring of the previously distinct spheres of domestic and foreign policy, it made sense for those strategies and policy decisions designed for consumption at home to be transposed abroad. The focus of this chapter is the design of these three areas of domestic policy; the unmistakeable imprint of Brown in these areas and their place in building of New Labour’s political economy. Strikingly, Brown’s hand in these policies and the themes that underpinned them would again reappear in the international development policies explored in much greater detail later in the book.

Resolve, Accept, or Avoid: Effects of Group Conflict on Foreign Policy Decisions

2001 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles F. Hermann ◽  
Janice Gross Stein ◽  
Bengt Sundelius ◽  
Stephen G. Walker
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Group Conflict ◽  
Policy Decisions

scholarly journals Expert-analytical Support of Foreign Policy Activities

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (5) ◽  
pp. 22-48
Author(s):  
A. A. Varfolomeev ◽  
O. P. Ivanov ◽  
I. V. Surma ◽  
Y. A. Trefilova
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Policy Decisions ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
Detailed Interpretation ◽  
Two Stages ◽  
Expert Community

The article presents the final results of the project studying the system of expert and analytical support for foreign policy decisions. The project is devoted to conducting a survey and a set of interviews with employees of government bodies (leaders and chief specialists) who are involved in the process of preparing and making foreign policy decisions. The article contains the officials’ assessment of the main challenges when interacting with the scientific and expert community, as well as a "desired image" of such interaction.The study was held in two stages (stage I in February-October 2020, stage II-in January-August 2021) in the form of a survey with a set of follow-up interviews for a more detailed interpretation of the data obtained. The interviewees included 24 employees of federal executive bodies (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and Rossotrudnichestvo; departments of international cooperation of line ministries, agencies and services); offices of the chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (departments providing international and inter-parliamentary cooperation). All participants of the study are in positions of the "managers" category or are part of the group of "chief specialists", that is, they have experience in decision-making process and/or in elaborating them. The survey and interviews were anonymous. The research is within structural-functional, institutional and regulatory approaches. The authors note that informational materials with low level of generalization and lacking recommendations and forecasts will never replace genuine analytics and expertise. Given the development of artificial intelligence, generalizing information will be automatized. As a result, expertise has to be of better quality.

Know Thyself: What Is “Wilsonianism”?

2018 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Tony Smith
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Decisions ◽  
Woodrow Wilson ◽  
Liberal Internationalism ◽  
History Of

This introductory chapter provides an overview of Wilsonianism, which comprises a set of ideas called American liberal internationalism. More than a century after Woodrow Wilson became president of the United States, his country is still not certain how to understand the important legacy for the country's foreign policy of the tradition that bears his name. Wilsonianism remains a living ideology whose interpretation continues either to motivate, or to serve as a cover for, a broad range of American foreign policy decisions. However, if there is no consensus on what the tradition stands for, or, worse, if there is a consensus but its claims to be part of the tradition are not borne out by the history of Wilsonianism from Wilson's day until the late 1980s, then clearly a debate is in order to provide clarity and purpose to American thinking about world affairs today.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Jeffrey A. Friedman
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Probabilistic Reasoning ◽  
International Politics ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Policy Decisions ◽  
High Profile ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
Policy Analysts ◽  
Bay Of Pigs

This chapter describes widespread skepticism regarding the value of assessing uncertainty in international politics. “Agnostics” argue that assessments of uncertainty in international politics are too unreliable to be useful for shaping major foreign policy decisions. “Rejectionists” argue that attempting to assess uncertainty in international politics can be counterproductive, surrounding foreign policy analyses with illusions of rigor or exposing foreign policy analysts to excessive criticism. “Cynics” claim that foreign policy analysts and decision makers have self-interested motives to avoid assessing uncertainty. The chapter explains how these ideas lead many scholars, practitioners, and pundits to avoid holding careful debates about the risks surrounding major foreign policy choices. The chapter describes how this aversion to probabilistic reasoning appears in several high-profile cases, such as President Kennedy’s decision to authorize the Bay of Pigs invasion and President Obama’s decision to raid Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.

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