scholarly journals Beyond ‘Liberals’ and ‘Conservatives’: Complexity in Ideology, Moral Intuitions, and Worldview among Swedish Voters

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 448-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Artur Nilsson ◽  
Henry Montgomery ◽  
Girts Dimdins ◽  
Maria Sandgren ◽  
Arvid Erlandsson ◽  
...  

This research investigated the congruence between the ideologies of political parties and the ideological preferences ( N = 1515), moral intuitions ( N = 1048), and political values and worldviews ( N = 1345) of diverse samples of Swedish adults who voted or intended to vote for the parties. Logistic regression analyses yielded support for a series of hypotheses about variations in ideology beyond the left–right division. With respect to social ideology, resistance to change and binding moral intuitions predicted stronger preference for a social democratic (vs. progressive) party on the left and weaker preference for a social liberal (vs. social conservative or liberal–conservative) party on the right. With respect to political values and broader worldviews, normativism and low acceptance of immigrants predicted the strongest preference for a nationalist party, while environmentalism predicted the strongest preference for a green party. The effects were generally strong and robust when we controlled for left–right self–placements, economic ideology, and demographic characteristics. These results show that personality variation in the ideological domain is not reducible to the simplistic contrast between ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’, which ignores differences between progressive and non–progressive leftists, economic and green progressives, social liberal and conservative rightists, and nationalist and non–nationalist conservatives.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Artur Nilsson ◽  
Henry Montgomery ◽  
Girts Dimdins ◽  
Maria Sandgren ◽  
Arvid Erlandsson ◽  
...  

This research investigated the congruence between the ideologies of political parties and the ideological preferences (N = 1515), moral intuitions (N = 1048), and political values and worldviews (N = 1345) of diverse samples of Swedish adults who voted or intended to vote for the parties. Logistic regression analyses yielded support for a series of hypotheses about variations in ideology beyond the left-right division. With respect to social ideology, resistance to change and binding moral intuitions predicted stronger preference for a social democratic (vs. progressive) party on the left and weaker preference for a social liberal (vs. social conservative or liberal-conservative) party on the right. With respect to political values and broader worldviews, normativism and low acceptance of immigrants predicted the strongest preference for a nationalist party, while environmentalism predicted the strongest preference for a green party. The effects were generally strong and robust when we controlled for left-right self-placements, economic ideology, and demographic characteristics. These results show that personality variation in the ideological domain is not reducible to the simplistic contrast between “liberals” and “conservatives”, which ignores differences between progressive and non-progressive leftists, economic and green progressives, social liberal and conservative rightists, and nationalist and non-nationalist conservatives.


Asian Survey ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 58 (5) ◽  
pp. 874-897 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lev Nachman

Why would opposition movement activists not support an established opposition political party? Taiwan’s 2016 presidential election is apropos. This study shows that the Democratic Progressive Party lost support from leftist activists not only because of ideological distance but because they see the party as flawed and ineffective. But activists still voted strategically for Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP to thwart the Nationalist Party from winning the election.


Modern Italy ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Donovan

Silvio Berlusconi impacted massively on Italy's party politics. He restructured the right via Forza Italia and the People of Freedom co-creating a bipolar party system whilst championing a radical personalisation of politics. The new party system appeared to rotate around him, creating an unusual version of ‘moderate pluralism’. Thus, whilst there was government alternation, there was also gladiatorial confrontation more typical of ‘polarised pluralism’. More effective as an electoral mobiliser than a government leader, Berlusconi's fourth government collapsed in the face of the 2011 economic crisis. His party, whose institutionalisation had been prevented by the extreme personalisation of his leadership, began to fall apart, whilst voter disillusion boosted support for a new party, the Five Star Movement. By 2014, it appeared that Berlusconi's major legacies were the rise of Matteo Renzi, the new Prime Minister and leader of the Democratic Party; his failure to construct an enduring, moderate conservative party; and the exceptional success of the Five Star Movement.


Author(s):  
Jacob R. Gunderson

Scholars have long been concerned with the implications of income inequality for democracy. Conventional wisdom suggests that high income inequality is associated with political parties taking polarized positions as the left advocates for increased redistribution while the right aims to entrench the position of economic elites. This article argues that the connection between party positions and income inequality depends on how party bases are sorted by income and the issue content of national elections. It uses data from European national elections from 1996 to 2016 to show that income inequality has a positive relationship with party polarization on economic issues when partisans are sorted with respect to income and when economic issues are relatively salient in elections. When these factors are weak, however, the author finds no relationship between income inequality and polarization.


1993 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 339-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annette Strauss

The ruling National Party (N.P.) asked white voters during the 1989 election campaign for a mandate to negotiate with all concerned about a new constitution, an undivided South Africa, one citizenship, equal votes, protection of minorities, and the removal of stumbling blocks such as discrimination against people of colour.1 Although the N.P. achieved a cleat majority – 93 seats against 39 for the Conservative Party (C.P.) and 33 for the Democratic Party (D.P.) – the right-wing opposition made destinct progress by gaining 17 seats. After the C.P had captured a further three from the N.P. in by-elections, including Potchefstroom in February 1992, President F. W. de Klerk announced in Parliament that whites would be asked the following month to vote in a referendum in order to remove any doubts about his mandate. The carefully worded question which the electorate had to answer was as follows: Do you support continuation of the reform process which the State President began on February 2, 1990 and which is aimed at a new constitution through negotiation?


2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 340-364
Author(s):  
Md. Abdul Mannan

This article examines the connection between politics of Islamo-nationalism in Bangladesh and Bangladesh’s policy of balancing against India. In response to India’s regional supremacy in South Asia, especially India’s dominance over Bangladesh, policy makers in Bangladesh have constantly faced two options: either ‘bandwagoning’ with India, or ‘balancing’ against the regional hegemon. Interestingly, since the 1990s until 2013, Bangladesh’s response has always swung from one side to another – from bandwagoning to balancing – in connection with the rotation of Bangladesh regime between two major political parties: the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Bangladesh Awami League (AL). Bangladesh – with the BNP’s hold on power – preferred a policy of balancing against India’s dominance. During the regime of the AL, such policy dramatically shifted towards bandwagoning with India. The BNP’s preference for a balancing policy constitutes a puzzle. Weak states – which are not capable of changing unequal outcomes in the face of a preponderant power – generally pursue a policy of bandwagoning. Thus, the puzzle is as to why Bangladesh – despite being a weak actor vis-a-vis India’s overwhelming regional supremacy – pursued a policy of balancing against India during the BNP’s hold on power. This article asserts that the BNP’s politics of Islamo-nationalism is a key variable that can answer the above puzzle. The ‘self–other’ notion of Islamo-nationalism defines the national ‘selfness’ of Bangladesh in terms of the Islamic identity for its overwhelming Muslim masses, and constructs India, henceforth in this article, ‘Hindu India’, as the ‘enemy–other’ to ‘Muslim Bangladesh’.


Author(s):  
Sidney M. Milkis

This chapter examines the wayward path of Progressivism from Roosevelt's Bull Moose campaign to the Obama presidency. Committed to “pure democracy,” many early-twentieth-century reformers hoped to sweep away intermediary organizations like political parties. In their disdain for partisan politics and their enthusiasm for good government, they sought to fashion the Progressive Party as a party to end parties. However, the Progressives failed in that ambition, and their shortfall has had profound effects on contemporary government and politics. By transforming rather than transcending parties, they fostered a kindred, though bastardized, alternative: executive-centered partisanship. The transformation of parties set in motion by the Progressives has subjected both Progressivism and conservatism to an executive-centered democracy that subordinates “collective responsibility” to the needs of presidential candidates and incumbents.


2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eiríkur Bergmann

Though nationalism has always been strong in Iceland, populist political parties did not emerge as a viable force until after the financial crisis of 2008. On wave of the crisis a completely renewed leadership took over the country’s old agrarian party, the Progressive Party (PP), which was rapidly transformed in a more populist direction. Still the PP is perhaps more firmly nationalist than populist. However, when analyzing communicational changes of the new postcrisis leadership it is unavoidable to categorize the party amongst at least the softer version of European populist parties, perhaps closest to the Norwegian Progress Party.


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