The impact of changing financial work incentives on the earnings of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) beneficiaries

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 708-728 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert R. Weathers ◽  
Jeffrey Hemmeter
Keyword(s):  
Social Security ◽  
Disability Insurance ◽  
Social Security Disability Insurance ◽  
Work Incentives ◽  
Social Security Disability ◽  
The Impact

Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income Work Incentives with Recommendations for Policy Change

1998 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 8-17
Author(s):  
James R. Sheldon ◽  
John S. Trach
Keyword(s):  
Social Security ◽  
Policy Change ◽  
Disability Insurance ◽  
Supplemental Security Income ◽  
Social Security Disability Insurance ◽  
Work Incentives ◽  
Work Activity ◽  
Social Security Disability

This paper summarizes current Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) rules governing how work affects benefits, and explains how work activity affects Medicare and Medicaid. Recommendations are provided for policy change in order for the SSDI and SSI rules to operate as true work incentives.

Who’s at risk of entering Social Security Disability Insurance? A comparison of application and allowance rates for groups of at-risk individuals

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kara Contreary ◽  
Todd Honeycutt
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
Social Security ◽  
Disability Insurance ◽  
Risk Groups ◽  
Evidence Base ◽  
Social Security Disability Insurance ◽  
Program Participation ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Social Security Disability ◽  
Employment Characteristics

BACKGROUND: The U.S. government has implemented several programs to reduce federal expenditures on Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and help beneficiaries return to work, but the limited success of these efforts has raised interest in approaches that help workers with disabilities remain in the workforce. OBJECTIVE: This paper provides information on individuals at risk of applying for DI benefits to help build the evidence base for policies that provide workers with disabilities support to eliminate the need to apply for and receive DI benefits. METHODS: Using three panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to SSA administrative data, we describe the employment characteristics of seven groups at risk of applying for DI benefits before and after application, as well as the outcomes of their DI applications. RESULTS: New private disability insurance recipients were more likely to apply for and receive DI than members of other at-risk groups. However, individuals with high healthcare expenditures made up the largest proportion of successful applicants across the at-risk groups considered here. CONCLUSION: While it seems plausible that individuals within an at-risk group who are likely to apply for DI benefits can be identified and provided supports to help them maintain employment, focusing on a specific group to promote employment over DI benefits may have a limited effect on the DI program because applicants come from multiple groups.

Placement Decision Dilemmas and Solutions

1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (6) ◽  
pp. 268-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
A.G. Hopf
Keyword(s):  
Social Security ◽  
Service Delivery ◽  
Educational System ◽  
Supported Employment ◽  
Disability Insurance ◽  
Social Security Disability Insurance ◽  
Placement Decisions ◽  
Placement Decision ◽  
Social Security Disability

This paper presents the private agency's view of the service-delivery dilemma of funding versus placement decisions. It focuses on three program areas to highlight this dilemma: 1) Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) disincentives to competitive placement, 2) the private agency's role when the educational system falls short, and 3) supported employment.

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