The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance , by David E. Lewis, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006, 293 pp., $60.00 hardcover, $24.95 paperback

2009 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 753-757
Author(s):  
Evan J. Ringquist
Keyword(s):  
Political Control ◽  
Presidential Appointments ◽  
Princeton University ◽  
Bureaucratic Performance

scholarly journals Is the Failed Pandemic Response a Symptom of a Diseased Administrative State?

Daedalus ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 150 (3) ◽  
pp. 68-88
Author(s):  
David E. Lewis
Keyword(s):  
Political Control ◽  
Administrative State ◽  
Presidential Appointments ◽  
Pandemic Response ◽  
Bureaucratic Performance ◽  
Agency Design ◽  
Vanderbilt University

Abstract David E. Lewis is the Rebecca Webb Wilson University Distinguished Professor and Professor of Law (by courtesy) at Vanderbilt University. He is the author of Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design (2003) and The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance (2008).

scholarly journals Control without Confirmation: The Politics of Vacancies in Presidential Appointments

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
CHRISTINA M. KINANE
Keyword(s):  
Policy Making ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Political Control ◽  
Presidential Appointments ◽  
Capacity To Act ◽  
First Mover Advantage ◽  
First Mover ◽  
Legislative Approval

Scholarship on separation of powers assumes executives are constrained by legislative approval when placing agents in top policy-making positions. But presidents frequently fill vacancies in agency leadership with unconfirmed, temporary officials or leave them empty entirely. I develop a novel dataset of vacancies across 15 executive departments from 1977 to 2016 and reevaluate the conventional perspective that appointment power operates only through formal channels. I argue that presidents’ nomination strategies include leaving positions empty and making interim appointments, and this choice reflects presidents’ priorities and the character of vacant positions. The evidence indicates that interim appointees are more likely when positions have a substantial capacity to act on presidential expansion priorities and suggest that presidents can capitalize on their first-mover advantage to evade Senate confirmation. The results further suggest that separation of powers models may need to consider how deliberate inaction and sidestepping of formal powers influence political control and policy-making strategies.

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