Proposal Would Codify Minimum Standards of Due Diligence for Intermediate Sanctions Purposes

2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-8
Keyword(s):  
Due Diligence ◽  
Minimum Standards ◽  
Intermediate Sanctions

Investor-State Dispute Settlement under NAFTA Chapter 11: The Shape of Things to Come?

1998 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 263-290
Author(s):  
J. Anthony VanDuzer
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Minimum Standards ◽  
The North ◽  
State Behaviour ◽  
Nafta Chapter 11 ◽  
To Come ◽  
The Right

SummaryRecently, there has been a proliferation of international agreements imposing minimum standards on states in respect of their treatment of foreign investors and allowing investors to initiate dispute settlement proceedings where a state violates these standards. Of greatest significance to Canada is Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, which provides both standards for state behaviour and the right to initiate binding arbitration. Since 1996, four cases have been brought under Chapter 11. This note describes the Chapter 11 process and suggests some of the issues that may arise as it is increasingly resorted to by investors.

Diligentia quam in suis as a Technique for a Contextual Application of the Full Protection and Security Standard: Considering the Level of Development of Host States in International Investment Law

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 596-611
Author(s):  
Nitish Monebhurrun
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Due Diligence ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
International Investment Law ◽  
Local Means ◽  
Security Standard ◽  
Maximum Protection ◽  
Investment Law ◽  
Full Protection

With international investment law as the background to this study, the present article examines how the full protection and security standard can be construed from the perspective of developing states hosting foreign investments. The research delves into classical public international law to argue that the diligentia quam in suis rule can be used as a means of interpretation to strike a balance between foreign investors’ and developing states’ interests when construing the full protection and security standard. The rule provides that any expected due diligence from the state party is necessarily of a subjective nature. This means that developing host states must deploy their best efforts to offer maximum protection to foreign investors not on an in abstracto basis but as per their local means and capacity. Accordingly, the standard is presented as an adaptable and flexible one which moulds its contours as per the level of development of the host state. Such flexibility does not imply condoning states’ abuse and negligence. The article explains how the diligentia quam in suis rule enables a conciliation between the full protection and security standard and the host state's level of development while rationalising the standard's application to developing nations.

HR Due Diligence

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
ChyeKok Ho ◽  
Chin Seng Koh
Keyword(s):  
Due Diligence

Vendor Due Diligence

2005 ◽  
Vol 34 (10) ◽  
pp. 548-553
Author(s):  
Sebastian Friese ◽  
Thomas Mittendorf ◽  
J.-Matthias Graf von der Schulenburg
Keyword(s):  
Due Diligence

RJC Due Diligence Member Toolkit

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 230-230
Author(s):  
Carol M. Stockton
Keyword(s):  
Due Diligence

DEKADENSI PEMILIHAN HAKIM AGUNG OLEH DPR RI

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-104
Author(s):  
Rustam Magun Pikahulan
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Due Diligence ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Institutional Status ◽  
The Government

Abstract: The Plato's conception of the rule of law states that good governance is based on good law. The organization also spreads to the world of Supreme Court justices, the election caused a decadence to the institutional status of the House of Representatives as a people's representative in the government whose implementation was not in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No.27/PUU-XI/2013 explains that the House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only approve or disapprove candidates for Supreme Court Justices that have been submitted by the Judicial Commission. In addition, the proportion of proposed Supreme Court Justices from the judicial commission to the House of Representatives (DPR) has changed, whereas previously the Judicial Commission had to propose 3 (three) of each vacancy for the Justices, now it is only one of each vacant for Supreme Court Judges. by the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only "approve" or "disagree" the Supreme Judge candidates nominated by the Judicial Commission.

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