Braess' paradox: A cooperative game‐theoretic point of view

Networks ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauro Passacantando ◽  
Giorgio Gnecco ◽  
Yuval Hadas ◽  
Marcello Sanguineti
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Braess Paradox ◽  
Theoretic Point ◽  
Game Theoretic

AN OVERVIEW ON GAME THEORY APPLICATIONS TO ENGINEERING

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (03) ◽  
pp. 1340019 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOAQUIN SANCHEZ-SORIANO
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Sole Purpose ◽  
Engineering Problems ◽  
Theoretic Point ◽  
Game Theoretic

In this paper, we review some of the literature in which different applications to engineering problems are analyzed from a game-theoretic point of view. The revision is far from exhaustive and the sole purpose of this paper is to provide an approximate state-of-the-art on this topic. Likewise, we try throughout the paper to highlight what game theory could contribute to the study of engineering problems.

EQUILIBRIUM PRICES FOR MONETARY UTILITY FUNCTIONS

2008 ◽  
Vol 11 (03) ◽  
pp. 325-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAMIR FILIPOVIĆ ◽  
MICHAEL KUPPER
Keyword(s):  
Utility Functions ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Pricing Rules ◽  
Maximum Utility ◽  
Theoretic Point ◽  
Sufficient And Necessary Conditions ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Monetary Utility Functions ◽  
Consumption Constraints

This paper provides sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of equilibrium pricing rules for monetary utility functions under convex consumption constraints. These utility functions are characterized by the assumption of a fully fungible numeraire asset ("cash"). Each agent's utility is nominally shifted by exactly the amount of cash added to his endowment. We find the individual maximum utility that each agent is eligible for in an equilibrium and provide a game theoretic point of view for the fair allocation of the aggregate utility.

PRICING OF RAINBOW OPTIONS: GAME THEORETIC APPROACH

2007 ◽  
Vol 09 (02) ◽  
pp. 215-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Z. HUCKI ◽  
V. N. KOLOKOLTSOV
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Discrete Time ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Explicit Calculation ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Risky Assets ◽  
Common Stocks ◽  
Theoretic Point ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

The general approach for the pricing of rainbow (or colored) options with fixed transaction costs is developed from the game theoretic point of view. The evolution of the underlying common stocks is considered in discrete time. The main result consists in the explicit calculation of the hedge price for a variety of the rainbow options including option delivering the best of J risky assets and cash, calls on the maximum of J risky assets and the multiple-strike options. The results obtained can be also used in the framework of real options.

scholarly journals Classical realizability and arithmetical formulæ

2016 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 1068-1107 ◽  
Author(s):  
MAURICIO GUILLERMO ◽  
ÉTIENNE MIQUEY
Keyword(s):  
Computer Science ◽  
Theoretical Computer Science ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Theoretical Computer ◽  
Mathematical Structures ◽  
Theoretic Point ◽  
Winning Strategies ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Definition Of

In this paper, we treat the specification problem in Krivine classical realizability (Krivine 2009Panoramas et synthèses27), in the case of arithmetical formulæ. In the continuity of previous works from Miquel and the first author (Guillermo 2008Jeux de réalisabilité en arithmétique classique, Ph.D. thesis, Université Paris 7; Guillermo and Miquel 2014Mathematical Structures in Computer Science, Epub ahead of print), we characterize the universal realizers of a formula as being the winning strategies for a game (defined according to the formula). In the first sections, we recall the definition of classical realizability, as well as a few technical results. In Section 5, we introduce in more details the specification problem and the intuition of the game-theoretic point of view we adopt later. We first present a game1, that we prove to be adequate and complete if the language contains no instructions ‘quote’ (Krivine 2003Theoretical Computer Science308259–276), using interaction constants to do substitution over execution threads. We then show that as soon as the language contain ‘Quote,’ the game is no more complete, and present a second game2that is both adequate and complete in the general case. In the last Section, we draw attention to a model-theoretic point of view and use our specification result to show that arithmetical formulæ are absolute for realizability models.

‘NEXT’ events: a cooperative game theoretic view to festivals

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luc Champarnaud ◽  
Amandine Ghintran ◽  
Frédéric Jouneau-Sion
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Game Theoretic
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