Does the fellow‐villager relationship between the independent director and the chairman of the board can inhibit the major shareholder expropriation? Evidence from China

Author(s):  
Yike Yu ◽  
Danting Cao ◽  
Zuogong Wang ◽  
Zaijie Zhang
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dain C. Donelson ◽  
Elizabeth Tori ◽  
Christopher G. Yust

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vidya Sukumara Panicker ◽  
Rajesh Srinivas Upadhyayula

PurposeThis paper attempts to examine the activity and involvement of board of directors in internationalization activities of firms in emerging markets, by evaluating the resource provisioning roles of interlocks provided by board of directors, and the frequency of board meetings. We demonstrate that the effectiveness of board involvement is contingent upon the levels of family ownership in firms since family ownership could impact the firm’s ability to utilize the presence of different types of board members.Design/methodology/approachThe authors test our hypotheses on a sample of listed Indian companies, extracted from the Prowess database published by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), a database of the financial performance of Indian companies. On a panel of 3,133 firm years of 605 unique Indian firms with foreign investments, over a time period of 2006–2017, the authors apply different estimation techniques.FindingsThe results demonstrate that both board meeting frequency and director interlocks are instrumental in supporting internationalization activities in emerging market firms. However, family ownership moderates the role of insider and independent interlocks on internationalization investments in different ways; the authors find that interlocks provided by independent directors support internationalization activities in family firms, whereas those provided by insider directors do not. Further, the study also finds that board meetings are less effective in internationalization of family firms.Practical implicationsThe authors conclude that family firms aiming at international diversification require to develop more connected and networked independent directors to enable internationalization in firms. While independent director interlocks enhance the international investments, it is also useful to know that board meetings are ineffective in utilizing the resources in family firms. This points to the possibility that family firms should device mechanisms to integrate family meetings with board meetings so that they can utilize the within-family processes to aid in their internationalization decisions.Originality/valueThe study contributes to resource dependence theory by understanding its limiting role in family firms. Theoretically, it helps delineate the limiting resource provision role of the insider directors vis-à-vis independent directors. The authors argue that the resource provision role of insider director interlocks does not effectively help in internationalization in comparison to independent director interlocks in family-dominated firms. Consequently, the study shows the limiting role of resource provision and utilization by family-owned firms in comparison to non-family-owned firms.


Author(s):  
RRdiger Fahlenbrach ◽  
Angie Low ◽  
Renn M. Stulz
Keyword(s):  

Fontanus ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Fong

J.W. McConnell (1877–1963) was one of the most successful Canadian businessmen of his time, and possibly the richest man in Canada for much of his life. A promoter of stocks early in his career, he soon became a major industrialist and investor. He was president of St. Lawrence Sugar Refineries Limited for almost fifty years and publisher of the Montreal Daily Star and other newspapers for almost twenty-five. Among the companies of which he was a major shareholder were the International Nickel Company of Canada, Brazilian Traction, Montreal Tramways, Montreal Light, Heat and Power, Ogilvie Flour Mills, Canada Steamship Lines, and Borden. His reputation spread to Wall Street and the City of London, not only for his business acumen but also for his great generosity to medical and educational causes. He was one of the principal founders of the Montreal Neurological Institute. From 1909 to 1927, he was one of the most effective fundraisers in the country, for the YMCA, the war effort through Victory Loans, and the hospitals of Montreal. And for the remainder of his life he was the most generous contributor to good causes in Montreal if not in Canada as a whole.With Lord Strathcona and Sir William Macdonald, he became one of the three greatest benefactors of McGill. After the death of Sir Edward Beatty, the Chancellor of the university, in 1943, McConnell was a natural candidate to succeed him. The board of governors, who were responsible for choosing a new Chancellor, were nearly all businessmen like him, and his assumption of the post would have been indeed in the tradition of James Ferrier, Strathcona, Macdonald and Beatty. But McConnell did not become Chancellor, and this is the story of why he did not. In abbreviated form, this was published in chapter 17 of the author’s biography of McConnell in 2008. This article however presents considerably more detail.ResuméJ.W. McConnell (1877–1963) fut un des hommes d’affaires les plus prospères de son époque, et possiblement un des hommes les plus riches du Canada pour la plus grande partie de sa vie. Promoteur d’actions au début de sa carrière, il devint rapidement un industriel et un investisseur d’importance. Il fut président de la compagnie St. Lawrence Sugar Refineries Limited pendant presque cinquante ans, et éditeur du Montreal Daily Star et de divers autres journaux pendant presque vingt-cinq ans. Il fut un actionnaire important de plusieurs compagnies, notamment International Nickel Company of Canada, Brazilian Traction, Montreal Tramways, Montreal Light, Heat and Power, Ogilvie Flour Mills, Canada Steamship Lines, et Borden. Sa réputation se progagea jusqu’à Wall Street et Londres, non seulement pour sa perspicacité en affaires mais aussi pour sa grande générosité envers les bonnes causes dans les domaines de la medecine et de l’éducation. Il fut un des fondateurs principaux de l’Institut neurologique de Montréal. De 1909 à 1927, il fut un collecteur de fonds les plus efficaces au Canada, au profit de l’organisme YMCA, de l’effort de guerre par le biais du programme des Prêts de la victoire, et des hôpitaux montréalais. Il demeura pour le reste de sa vie un fort généreux contributeur aux bonnes causes à Montréal, sinon au Canada tout entierAvec Lord Strathcona et Sir William Macdonald, il devint une des trois plus grands bienfaiteurs de l’Université McGill. Après la mort de Sir Edward Beatty, le chancelier de l’Université, en 1942, McConnell fut un candidat tout désigné pour lui succéder. Les membres du Conseil des gouverneurs, qui avaient la responsabilité de choisir un nouveau chancelier, étaient presque tous des hommes d’affaire comme lui, et il aurait été dans la tradition de James Ferrier, Strathcona, Macdonald et Beatty que McConnell accède à ce poste. Toutefois, McConnell ne devint pas chancelier, et ceci est l’histoire qui raconte pourquoi il ne l’est pas devenu. Elle a été publiée sous la forme du chapitre 17 de la biographie de McConnell. Cet article, toutefois, présente considérablement plus de détails.


Author(s):  
Danuse Bement ◽  
Ryan Krause

Boards of directors are governing bodies that reside at the apex of the modern corporation. Boards monitor the behavior of firm management, provide managers access to knowledge, expertise, and external networks, and serve as advisors and sounding boards for the CEO. Board attributes such as board size and independence, director demographics, and firm ownership have all been studied as antecedents of effective board functioning and, ultimately, firm performance. Steady progress has been made toward understanding how boards influence firm outcomes, but several key questions about board leadership structure remain unresolved. Research on board leadership structure encompasses the study of board chairs, lead independent directors, and board committees. Board chair research indicates that when held by competent individuals, this key leadership position has the potential to contribute to efficient board functioning and firm performance. Researchers have found conflicting evidence regarding CEO duality, the practice of the CEO also serving as the board chair. The effect of this phenomenon—once ubiquitous among U.S. boards—ranges widely based on circumstances such as board independence, CEO power, and/or environmental conditions. Progressively, however, potential negative consequences of CEO duality proposed by agency theory appear to be counterbalanced by other governance mechanisms and regulatory changes. A popular mechanism for a compromise between the benefits of CEO duality and independent monitoring is to establish the role of a lead independent director. Although research on this role is in its early stage, results suggest that when implemented properly, the lead independent director can aid board monitoring without adding confusion to a unified chain of command. Board oversight committees, another key board leadership mechanism, improve directors’ access to information, enhance decision-making quality by allowing directors to focus on specialized topics outside of board meetings, and increase the speed of response to critical matters. Future research on the governance roles of boards, leadership configurations, and board committees is likely to explore theories beyond agency and resource dependence, as well as rely less on collecting archival data and more on finding creative ways to access rarely examined board interactions, such as board and committee meetings and executive sessions.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (8) ◽  
pp. 156
Author(s):  
Yuan Chang ◽  
Pang-Tien Lieu

Based on data of listed companies on Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) through 2001~2011, this paper examines whether board independence has effects on executive compensation and corporate performance. Existing studies lacked of considering self-selection of board independence in evaluating the effects of board independence on economic consequence. This may incur estimation bias because systematic factors determining firm’s introducing independent director also have influences on economic consequence. While Heckman (1979)’s two-step estimation addressed selection duo to unobservables, this paper employs propensity score matching (PSM) from Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1985a,b) to address sample selection duo to observables, and forms two groups of samples, namely, firms with independent director and firms without independent director but share similar characteristics with the former. Empirical evidence from regression estimation shows divergent outcomes under before-matching versus after-matching samples. Before matching, greater degree of board independence is associated with higher profitability and higher level of total and average executive compensation. After matching, outperformance as well as overpay on executive compensation of firm with greater board independence is vanished. After controlling selection bias duo to observables versus unobservables, our evidence concludes that greater board independence is uncorrelated with greater corporate performance and executive compensation overpay.


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