A buyout option alleviates implicit collusion in uniform‐price auctions

Author(s):  
Toshihiro Tsuchihashi
Keyword(s):  
2007 ◽  
Vol 137 (1) ◽  
pp. 729-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
David McAdams
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sylvain Bourjade

AbstractIn uniform price auctions, multiple prices are sustainable in equilibrium as a result of the market power of bidders. I show that low price equilibria are removed in a framework with asymmetric bidders who cannot anticipate the seller’s rationing strategy. Attracting high cost bidders’ participation in the auction induces the low cost bidders to bid more aggressively in order to eliminate the high cost bidders. Ex-post optimal equilibria with non-increasing demand schedules only exist when the seller is allowed to use any degree of rationing.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Yanling Chang ◽  
Lu Sun ◽  
Matthew F. Keblis ◽  
Jie Yang
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 122-130
Author(s):  
Axel Ockenfels ◽  
Christoph M. Schmidt

Abstract The discussion of climate policy received new impetus in the spring of 2019. Since then the topic has dominated the public discourse in Germany. The Fridays for Future movement continues to generate considerable pressure on policy makers. In addition, scientists emphasize in rare interdisciplinary unanimity both how urgent a radical renewal in climate policy would be, and that a uniform price for greenhouse gas emissions is the indispensable core element of the necessary reforms in Germany and Europe. One central aspect of climate policy is, however, often overlooked in all this: climate protection is essentially an international problem of cooperation. For climate change, it does not matter where greenhouse gases are emitted. The success of national climate policy must therefore be judged by whether it contributes to establishing international cooperation to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions.


1998 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
John C. Bernard ◽  
Timothy Mount ◽  
William Schulze

Restructuring of electric power markets is proceeding across the United States and in many other nations around the world. The performance of these markets will influence everything from the prices faced by consumers to the reliability of the systems. The challenges of these changes present many important areas for research. For much of the northeastern United States, restructuring proposals include, at least for the short term, the formation of a single-sided auction mechanism for the wholesale market. This research uses experimental methods to analyze how these markets may function. In the experiments, the two basic uniform price auction rules are tested under three different market sizes. Early experimental results suggest the commonly proposed last-accepted-offer auction works well, but market power could be a real concern.


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