The Brazilian bankruptcy law reform, corporate ownership concentration, and risk‐taking

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 562-573
Author(s):  
Henrique Castro Martins
2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pichaphop Chalermchatvichien ◽  
Seksak Jumreonwong ◽  
Pornsit Jiraporn

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (11) ◽  
pp. 138
Author(s):  
Pier Luigi Marchini ◽  
Veronica Tibiletti ◽  
Alice Medioli ◽  
Gianluca Gabrielli

Ever since major accounting scandals and corporate collapses of the early 2000’s, the improved risk taking and the lax approach to risk management procedures, which are viewed as contributing factors to the market breakdown that occurred in the international market and, in particular, in the U.S. in 2007, have led to an increased awareness of the importance of managing risk on the part of listed companies. Risk management has gained importance in the definition of what it means to be the best and most efficient corporate governance structure and mechanism, as it can play a fundamental role in helping to achieve the company’s target. Also disclosure related to risk management is fundamental for the efficient functioning of capital markets since it helps to improve corporate transparency and to reduce the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. This paper aims to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and corporate risk-taking behavior and disclosure, as a tool for protecting shareholders, among Italian listed companies. The analysis is devoted to the Italian stock market because it is strongly characterized by a high ownership concentration and by the presence of a family ownership model; and this scenario makes the Italian one an interesting case to study. Based on a sample of 233 Italian listed companies, through a multivariate regression, we find that a high level of ownership concentration is positively related to a firms' low level of risk taking by the board of directors, so giving interesting insights to regulators and practitioners, as well as for further research.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Prathama Nugraha

Bank is a financial institution that must able to guarantee the funds entrusted by the community. This guarantee related to the ability of banks to maintain their risk levels. As revealed by the theories and previous studies, a bank level of risk taking might determined by the concentration of the ownership, a party that determines the bank management. Additionally compliance in carrying out the principles of openness and the ability of banks to obtain other revenues outside the main business as intermediaries of funds from customers to the creditors also shown to determine the level of bank risk taking. By using multiple regression analysis techniques and observation of data during a period of 5 years, this study found that the level of a bank's risk taking is influenced by the disclosure of information and income diversification. The higher the index the information disclosure and diversification the lower the risk. Ownership concentration has shown the right coefficient direction corresponding to the risk but it is not statistically significant. Key Words: Risk Taking, Ownership Concentrations, Information Disclosure, Bank Income Diversification.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yusheng Kong ◽  
Takuriramunashe Famba ◽  
Grace Chituku-Dzimiro ◽  
Huaping Sun ◽  
Ophias Kurauone

This study analyzes corporate ownership as a corporate governance mechanism and its role in creating firm value. Previous research shows that there is no convergence on the firm-value corporate ownership relationship. Most research in this area takes a cross national approach ignoring the uniqueness of each institutional setting particularly those of emerging nations. Using a unique firm level dataset, we investigate how corporate control nature and ownership concentration affect the value of Chinese listed firms. First, non-state owned control is associated with a higher Tobin’s Q while a negative premium is found for state owned. Using the hybrid and the correlated random effects model we confirm a U-shaped non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and Tobin’s Q, implying that firm value first decreases and then increases as block holders own more shares. Further investigation reveals that the negative effect of ownership concentration is weaker when a firm equity nature is non-state owned enterprises (non-SOEs) compared to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). While ownership concentration appears to be an efficient mechanism for corporate governance its effect is weaker for SOEs compared to non-SOEs. The results support privatization of SOEs, sound reforms such as the split share structure reform as crucial for the development of China’s stock market.


Author(s):  
Porzycki Marek ◽  
Rachwał Anna

This chapter discusses the law on creditor claims in Poland, where a comprehensive insolvency law reform is ongoing. In May 2015, Parliament adopted the final text of the Restructuring Law (RL). Due to enter into force on 1 January 2016, it will cover four restructuring proceedings: arrangement approval; fast arrangement; arrangement; and reorganization. Their common aim will be rescuing the debtor’s enterprise via an arrangement adopted by a majority of creditors. They will apply in case of both threatened and actual insolvency, and replace the current reorganization bankruptcy and rarely used rehabilitation proceedings. The existing Bankruptcy and Rehabilitation Law will have its provisions on reorganization bankruptcy and rehabilitation proceedings repealed, and be renamed ‘Bankruptcy Law’. The chapter deals with insolvency claims, administration claims, and non-enforceable claims in turn. Each section covers: the definition and scope of the claim; rules for submission, verification, and satisfaction or admission of claims; ranking of claims; and voting and other participation rights in insolvency proceedings.


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